BMCR 2009.04.32: Citti on Inwood, Seneca. Selected Philosophical Letters. Clarendon Later Ancient Philosophers

Bryn Mawr Classical Review <[email protected]> Mon, 13 Apr 2009 18:23:00 -0400 (EDT)
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Brad Inwood (trans.), Seneca. Selected Philosophical Letters. Clarendon
Later Ancient Philosophers.  Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2007.
Pp. xxv, 409.  ISBN 978-0-19-823894-2.  $81.00.

Reviewed by Francesco Citti, University of Bologna
([email protected])
Word count:  3202 words
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In 2005 Brad Inwood--one of the most learned scholars of ancient
Stoicism--illustrated Seneca's philosophical works through a series of
essays, collected in Reading Seneca: Stoic Philosophy at Rome (Oxford,
Clarendon Press 2005):[[1]] with this anthology, Inwood pursues his
interpretation of Seneca as "a creative and engaged philosophical
writer, prepared to argue for the merits of the positions which he
holds" (p. xix), and not as a bare eclectic moralist, lacking in
intellectual coherence and independence. This perspective is complex
and fascinating, all the more so as "Seneca's reputation among
professional philosophers has sunk so low that by now he is barely
considered a philosopher at all", as observed by G. M. Ross in his
brief account of Seneca's Philosophical Influence.[[2]]

"Seneca's Life and Works" is briefly recalled in a couple of pages (pp.
xi-xii), thereafter the brief Introduction mainly focuses on the
Epistles to Lucilius as a literary and philosophical work ("The Nature
of Seneca's letters"; "Seneca's Motivation as Author"; "Seneca's
Approach to Writing Philosophy", pp. xii-xxi). Inwood rightly
underlines the importance first of all of Epicurus' letters, then of
Cicero's Ad Atticum, as a stimulus to adopt the form of the literary
epistles. The brevity of the treatment prevents Inwood from adding--in
addition to the basic bibliographical references -[[3]] certain
quotations among the numerous remarks on the epistolary form scattered
in Seneca's work: for instance in epist. 21,3-5 Seneca promises
Lucilius the same immortality Epicurus assured his friend Idomeneus,
just as Cicero's letters guaranteed Atticus the same. In epist.
118--translated and commented by Inwood (pp. 72ff. and 306ff.)--Seneca
defines which topics should be entertained and which ones laid aside
("... It is better to deal with one's own faults than those of other
people, to examine oneself and to see how many things one is
campaigning for, and to canvass for someone else"). He avoids everyday
matters--such as chats about the weather--in order to urge his friend
towards wisdom, focussing instead on quod et mihi et tibi prodesse
possit (epist. 23,1), a passage where prodesse--as elsewhere in
Seneca--is translated from the Stoic <greek>w)felei=n</greek>.[[4]]

Regarding the literary and mainly philosophic motivations of Seneca's
work, Inwood notes how prevalent nowadays is the position of
scholars--like Inwood Hadot, P. Hadot, M. Nussbaum and J. Cooper -[[5]]
who emphasize Seneca's role as a moral and spiritual guide. He objects,
however, commenting that this is only a persona, an "authorial
self-presentation" which does not necessarily coincide with "the key to
philosophical interpretation", and therefore does not constitute "his
basic authorial motivation" (p. xvii). From his point of view, this
reading tends also to  obscure interest in all the philosophical and
technical details, which are not connected to the role of a moral
guide, regarded in a strict sense: "in the letters Seneca writes a
great deal about physics, dialectic, and what we would call metaphysics
alongside of argumentation in ethics which is far more technical than
mere moral guidance requires" (p. xviii). Hence the conclusion that
"the safest approach to Seneca's work is, as I have suggested, to
regard him first and foremost as a man of letters, a litte/rateur, a
writer whose first concern is with his art and his audience" (p.
xviii).

No doubt--as underlined by Inwood--in Seneca's work we come across a
plurality of topics, voices and roles, that the author takes on in
turn, and we should not forget that his role as a spiritual guide "is
one that Seneca adopts to write his letters; it is apparently the voice
which he often wishes to be heard first by his readers" (p. xvii). In
Cooper's interpretation, however, we find this very tantalizing idea
equates--as a consequence of the recourse to dialogical and didactic
elements--the Epistulae ad Lucilium and the Dialogi:[[6]] "Seneca
relies for his persuasiveness much more often on the rhetorical rules
than the logical or philosophical aspects of his presentation".[[7]] In
fact Inwood seems to understimate the inseparability of style and
content in Seneca:[[8]] as observed by Alfonso Traina,[[9]] Seneca
(epist. 94,2 ff.) argues against Aristo the Stoic, that the decreta
philosophiae, the actual dogmas of philosophy, the sophistries are not
sufficient: it is necessary to resort to the psychagogic power of the
words, conveyed by the rhetoric. Therefore the philosopher assumes the
role of a monitor (epist. 94,72), a coactor (epist. 52,4), and appeals
to the emotions, making full use of maxims, verses or prose proverbs
(epist. 94, 25-28), which "need no special pleader; they go straight to
our emotions, and help us simply because Nature is exercising her
proper function" (transl. Gummere).

In the following pages (pp. xxi-xxiv) Inwood elucidates "The Selection
of Letters": a collection of 17 letters (58, 65, 66, 71, 76, 85, 87,
106, 113, 117, 118-124) gathered--as we shall see below--in five
groups. The selection responds to two main goals: the first one is to
present an anthology of letters which are of interest from a
philosophical point of view. The second one is to provide the reading
of at least one entire book, in order to let the reader appreciate the
literary unity of the books, beyond the apparent casual manner or
thematic incongruity. The choice made was book XX (epist. 118-124),
"which contains a very high concentration of philosophically important
letters". The result--plausibly deliberate--is that the book provides
us with a very innovative collection of texts so far often neglected by
commentators.[[10]] Inwood's is the first commentary on the whole book
XX; moreover the selection coincides in a very restricted way with
previous English collections such as Summers' (only epist. 76, 87,
122), and Costa's (only epist. 122).[[11]] Only epistle 65 was--when
Inwood undertook his work (in 2001)--the object of a comprehensive
commentary by Giuseppe Scarpat: in the meantime two monographs on
epistles 85 and 87 were published, too late for the author to take
account of them.[[12]]

The epistles are presented only in translation (pp. 1-103), since the
guidelines of the series state that "no knowledge of Greek or Latin is
assumed". Nevertheless it would be of great interest to glance at the
Latin original, particularly in the case of an author such as Seneca,
who--as seen above--theorizes the necessity of resorting to the action
of the words, to the oratorius vigor (epist. 100,8).

The brilliant translation expresses the style of Seneca's period at its
best, fragmented in a series of brief and concentrated sentences, in
parallel cola, often marked with an anaphora or other figures of sound,
or varied, in order to underline the conceptual antithesis, which
Inwood efficaciously reproduces. Let us consider for instance the
beginning of epist. 1:[[13]] "Do it, Lucilius my friend. Reclaim
yourself. Assemble and preserve your time, which has until now been
snatched out from you, stolen, or just gotten lost. Convince yourself
that what I say is true: some of our time is robbed from us, some
burgled, and some slips out of our hands. The most shameful loss,
though, is what happens through negligence. And if you're willing to
pay attention: a good deal of life is lost for those who conduct it
badly; most of it is lost for those who do nothing at all, but all of
life is lost for those who don't pay attention". The translation fairly
faithfully follows the original syntax, with its anaphoric repetitions
and synonymic variations, in particular in the two verbal series aut
auferebatur aut subripiebatur aut excidebat ... quaedam tempora
eripiuntur nobis, quaedam subducuntur, quaedam effluunt, and--in the
final tricolon--let the reader appreciate the anaphoric climax, and the
epiphora once again coupled with the synonymic variation (magna pars
vitae elabitur male agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota vita aliud
agentibus).

Likewise in epist. 85,23 (Finis, ut puto, edendi bibendique satietas
est. Hic plus edit, ille minus; quid refert? Uterque iam satur est. Hic
plus bibit, ille minus; quid refert? Uterque non sitit. Hic pluribus
annis vixit, hic paucioribus), a passage where the rendering of
repetitions and variations could be tricky, Inwood adopts a 'mimetic'
translation: "In my opinion, the goal of eating and of drinking is
satiety. One person eats more, another less. What difference does it
make? Both are now sated. One person drinks more, another less. What
difference does it make? Both are not thirsty" (p. 44).[[14]]

Finally let us examine the epigrammatic phrase of epist. 87,3 fecit
sibi pacem nihil timendo, fecit sibi divitias nihil concupiscendo,
comparing Gummere's translation ("and has secured peace for itself by
fearing nothing, and riches by craving no riches", vol. II, p. 325)
with Inwood's ("and makes itself calm by fearing nothing and makes
itself rich by desiring nothing", p. 48). The latter reproduces the
isocolic structure of the phrase with much more clarity, based on the
anaphora of fecit sibi ("makes itself"), the epiphora of the gerundive
coming before the negative ("by ...ing nothing") and the oppositions
pacem/divitias, timendo/concupiscendo.

Furthermore Inwood, in his commentary, does not fail to examine the
problems of translation and exegesis, which are often difficult to
understand fully without the Latin text. For instance, commenting
epist. 58,5 Inwood observes (p. 113): "'how much in Ennius and Accius
has been obscured by the disuse of words'. Alternative translation:
'how many words in Ennius and Accius have been overtaken by
disuse'".[[15]] Only with the original in front of his eyes (ut ex hoc
intellegas, quantum apud Ennium et Accium verborum situs occupaverit)
can the reader grasp the origin of the problem (verborum could be
connected to situs or with quantum) and approve Inwood's choice or not;
he adopts the second solution, in fact the more probable, with the
partitive (quantum...verborum).

The commentary takes up more than two thirds of the book (pp. 105-377).
Each group of letters is prefaced by a brief introduction which
illustrates its characteristics: group I presents three letters which
has in common "a focus on themes in Platonic and to a lesser extent
Aristotelian philosophy" (p. 107): the classification of beings (58),
the doctrine of causes (65), the nature and equality of goods and
virtues (66). Group II looks at topics eminently Stoic, like virtue and
the supreme good (71), which should be pursued in old age too
(76).[[16]] Letters 85 and 87 (group III) show a remarkable dialectical
argument with the Peripatetics, on topics such as the relationship
between virtue and happiness, the nature of goods and passions. Then
follows a group (IV) focused on the connection between Stoic
metaphysics and ethics: "106 addresses the question 'Is the good a
body?' 113 asks whether virtues are animals. 117 tackles a subtle
problem about the relationship between wisdom and 'being wise'" (p.
261). The last group (V, epist. 118-124) has not been selected on the
basis of thematic coherence, but--as we have seen--as an example of an
entire book, Book XX. As observed by Inwood, in this case as well, it
is possible to verify that certain topics recur: for instance the theme
of the nature of good recurs in epistles 117 and 118, "which ...
anticipates themes in 120, 121 and 124" (p. 306).

For each group Inwood illustrates the basic bibliography, and presents
in a synthetic and effective way the status quaestionis: thus, for
instance, introducing the Platonic epistles 58 and 65, the A. mentions
the various hypotheses according to which the Platonic material in
Seneca does not depend on a direct reading, but from an intermediate
source, such as Posidonius, Antiochus of Ascalon, Eudorus of
Alexandria, or in general from Middle Platonism.[[17]] However Inwood,
with a prudence that can be shared, prefers to underline the
specificities of the Senecan text (and also its incoherences),[[18]]
and to suggest the evident connection of the author with contemporary
Middle Platonism, rather than to go into the details of a complex and
probably not resolvable Quellenforschung.

A synthetic schema of the "thematic division" is followed by the actual
commentary to each letter. Likewise in the commentary Inwood's main
interest is in the links within the philosophical arguments, and the
relationships with the different schools, but the reader can also find
some textual and linguistic observations.

The text adopted is generally Reynolds's OCT (1965), from which Inwood
moves away--as indicated in the commentary--sometimes, in order to
avoid the cruces, and to provide a fully readable text.[[19]] This is
the case in epist. 65,15 ego quidem + peiora + illa ago ac tracto,
quibus pacatur animus, et me prius scrutor, deinde hunc mundum, where
Inwood adopts (p. 149)--with the majority of translators, including
Scarpat--Hense's correction potiora; or of epist. 123,12 (p. 359)
abducunt a patria, a parentibus, ab amicis, a virtutibus, et + inter
spem vitam misera nisi turpis inludunt +, where Inwood follows
Shackleton Bailey's conjecture in turpem vitam miseramque si turpis
illiciunt . We should certainly take Inwood's advice to correct the
text of epist. 58,10 Sed quaedam [quae] animum habent nec sunt
animalia, by reintroducing animam transmitted by all the manuscripts,
which is required  by the argument, and by the context (which follows
placet enim satis et arbustis animam inesse) instead of animum, perhaps
only a misprint in Reynolds' edition (in fact he doesn't add any
explanation in the critical apparatus).

The interest in Seneca's philosophical language, and in its
relationships with the Greek one--even if it doesn't correspond to the
focus of the commentary--is evident also in the selection of letter 58,
which deals with the verborum paupertas, immo egestas of the Latin
language: in addition to the parallel passages mentioned by Inwood (p.
112), one could recall also Cic. nat. deor. 1,8, where the author
refutes those who fear not being able to express in Latin what they
have learned in Greek (quae a Graecis accepissent Latine dici posse
diffiderent): he says that nowadays, also as far as the  copia verborum
is concerned, the Greeks do not seem to him to be superior any more; it
could be also useful to refer to the copious material collected by
Pease ad loc.[[20]]

Of some interest could be also a deeper examination of the dispute on
archaism: Seneca--following his master Stoics[[21]]--recognises the
natural origin of the language, and therefore a larger proprietas to
the archaic language, which however sometimes contrasts with the
consuetudo (cf. epist. 114,13 oratio certam regulam non habet:
consuetudo illam civitatis, quae numquam in eodem diu stetit, versat).
Hence the anti-archaism prevailing in epist. 125 (= Gell. 12,2-13),
while in epist. 78,5 we find a more reconciliatory position, since
archaism at times could be more suited to render the Greek
philosophical terminology.[[22]]

The lexical notes, often restricted to brief hints, are valuable in any
case: for instance, commenting on fastidium of 58,1 (p. 112), rightly
Inwood observes that the word implies "a strong overtone of aesthetic
contempt". One could also recall passages as Cic. opt. gen. 18 quid ...
est eorum in orationibus e Graeco conversis fastidium, nullum quom sit
in versibus?; fin. 1,10 ego autem mirari <satis> non queo unde hoc sit
tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium, from a context which is
actually debating the egestas patrii sermonis. In fact the passage goes
on with the clarification: non est omnino hic docendi locus; sed ita
sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, ut vulgo
putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. Or, from a similar
context, also Cic. Brut. 247 C. Memmius L. f. perfectus litteris sed
Graecis, fastidiosus sane Latinarum, argutus orator. Equally to be
appreciated are the observations on essentia (epist. 58) as a
translation from Greek <greek>ou)si/a</greek>: in addition to the
quoted passages (p. 113), one could also mention Apul. Plat. 1,6
<greek>ou)si/as</greek> quas essentias dicimus; a philologist could
also feel here the necessity to indicate that essentia is a correction
of Muretus instead of the transmitted quid sentiam.

The notes to epist. 121 contain a few interesting hints on the Latin
terminology for the <greek>oi)kei/wsis</greek>: Inwood rightly observes
(p. 340) that--when Seneca says (121,16) me natura commendat, and when
he adds (121,18) that tutela certissima ex proximo est, sibi quisque
commissus est--he is alluding to the Ciceronian commendatio
naturae.[[23]] We can add that further on as well (121,24), when
dealing with the innate capacities which allow the survival and the
tutela sui, Seneca adopts a Ciceronian rendering of
<greek>oi)kei/wsis</greek> (cf. fin. 4,38), which he also employs in
other passages (cf. e.g. epist. 58,30 modus et diligens sui tutela
perduxit illum ad senectutem, 85,28; 104,4). A Ciceronian imprint is
recognizable also in the conclusion (121,16): primum hoc instrumentum
<in> illa natura contulit ad permanendum, conciliationem et caritatem
sui. Each living being, indeed Seneca says in the De finibus, is sibi
commendatum (fin. 4,19 and 4,25): practises the conciliatio (cf. off.
1,149 nat. deor. 2,78, and also off. 1,12), the caritas (cf. fin. 5,37;
5,65 f.; 3,69), that is the conservatio sui.[[24]]

In the lexical notes as well Inwood's interest is focused on
interpretation: let us recall the note to lucifuga of epist. 122,19:
Inwood observes that here "the connotation is 'secretive, anti-social'.
See Cicero Fin. 1.61"; then he adds that "Clearly there is a double
entendre here",  such as the first significance, of 'night-owl' and the
pejorative one ("qui lucem (diei) fugit, tenebras amat, fere
contumeliose dictum", as explained by ThlL VII/2,1712,8) are coexistent
here. The other two English commentaries that we have at our disposal
for this text, Costa's and Summers', also insist on the form, attested
for the first time here, and then in Apul. Met. 5,19, and on the
occurences and significances of the parallel one, lucifugus.[[25]]As
for the difficult graecism lychnobius of epist. 122,16--not attested in
Greek, which seem to indicate here the person who "lives on lamp
oil"--Inwood turns out to be the most exhaustive and perceptive of the
three commentators: after recalling Summers' hypothesis that the term
implies a word play on <greek>li/xnos</greek>, 'avid', 'greedy', he
reports the comparison (suggested by Pre/chac) with Varro Men. 573 B.,
where someone keeps the oil for the vigil, rather than dressing the
asparagus with it (oleum in lucubrationem servabimus quam in asparagos
totam lecythum evertamus). In fact Papinius wasn't only a light-hating
man (lucifuga), but was also so frugal, that he didn't use up anything
except night (nihil consumebat nisi noctem): that someone called him
avarus et sordidus, someone else--as recounted by Albinovanus
Pedo--could call him lychnobius. Therefore Inwood is right, when he
says that "it is hard not to suspect that Pedo's quip is ironic": even
if a completely convincing explanation has not been found, one can also
recall Axelson's, according to whom "Eher meint wohl Pedo, Papinius sei
in doppelter Beziehung ein lychnobius gewesen, d.h. er habe nicht nur
(als lucifuga) bei, sondern auch (als Geizhals) von der Lampe (in
letzeren Fall dem Lampenoel) gelebt".[[26]]

In conclusion, the reader will find in Inwood's book an elucidation of
all the philosophical problems of the epistles examined, a careful
discussion of Seneca's interpretation of the doctrines of the various
schools (from Aristotle and Plato, to Epicurus and the Stoics), an
introduction to the main historical events or people mentioned in
Seneca, and a first access to the characteristics of philosophical
language. Even if specifically designed "to encourage philosophers and
students of philosophy to explore the fertile terrain of later ancient
philosophy" (in accordance to the aim of the series), this volume will
be of precious assistance to all people who--also being
philologists--intend to tackle reading Seneca's Epistles.

------------------
Notes:


1.   Reviewed by M. Graver, BMCR 2007.06.45; P. L. Donini, RSF 61
(2006) 371-377; A. Setaioli, Gnomon 79 (2007) 686-697; C. Edwards, CR
57 (2007) 118-120.

2.   Cf. G. M. Ross, Seneca's Philosophical Influence, in C. D. N.
Costa (ed.) Seneca, London-Boston 1974, pp. 116-165: quotation from p.
151.

3.   I should at least mention P. Cugusi, Evoluzione e forme
dell'epistolografia latina nella tarda Repubblica e nei primi due
secoli dell'Impero con cenni sull'epistolografia preciceroniana, Roma
1983, 195-206.

4.   Cf. e.g. Chrysipp. eth. 117 SVF III 28, 17 f. "to be of help
[<greek>w)felei=n</greek>] is a condition or an action in accordance
with virtue", 672 SVF III 168, 21s. <greek>w)felei=n kai\ w)felei=sqai
sofw=n e)sti</greek>, "to be of help and to be helped is characteristic
of the wisdom"; as for Seneca it's enough to recall the pervasiveness
of this topic in the De otio: 1,1; 3,3; 3,5 (ter); 6,4; 6,5; cf. Lucio
Anneo Seneca. De otio, testo e apparato critico, con introduzione,
versione e commento, a c. di I. Dionigi, Brescia 1983, 71-73, 163 f.,
255 f.

5.   In addition to the bibliography mentioned by Inwood, see I. Hadot,
Pre/face a Se/ne\que. Consolations. A Helvia, ma me\re. A Marcia,
traduit du latin par C. Laza, Paris 1979; P. Hadot, Exercices
spirituels et philosophie antique, Paris 1981. Similar positions also
in C. Edwards, Self-Scrutiny and Self-Transformation in Seneca's
Letters, G&R 44 (1997) 23-38.

6.   This comparison is now offered by the same Inwood--following
Foucault and Maurach--in The Importance of Form in Seneca's
Philosophical Letters, in Ancient Letters. Classical and Late Antique
Epistolography, ed. by R. Moriello--A.D. Morrison, Oxford 2007,
133-148: a paper much better documented and convincing than the
Introduction to the volume reviewed here. The A. is right to deny that
"this intensely dialogical style is typical of any of Seneca's literary
models for writings epistolary philosophy": it was typical neither of
Epicurus, nor of Plato and Cicero, but it constitutes "a personally
distinctive feature of Seneca's own writing style" (p. 147). One could
perhaps suspect an influence of the diatribe: cf. in addition to the
bibliography mentioned by A. Traina, Lo stile "drammatico" del filosofo
Seneca, Bologna 1995 (1974 1st ed.), 78, the paper of R. Coleman, The
Artful Moralist. A Study of Seneca's Epistolary Style, CQ 24 (1974)
276-289.

7.   J. M. Cooper, Moral Theory and Moral Improvement: Seneca (ch. 12),
in J.M.C., Knowledge, Nature, and the Good. Essays on Ancient
Philosophy, Princeton 2004, 309-334: quotation from p. 333.

8.   Cf. A. Setaioli's observation, in his review of Reading Seneca,
687 f.: the bibliography on the language and style is lacking: in
addition to Traina's and P. Grimal's works (e. g.: Le vocabulaire de
l'interiorite/ dans l'oeuvre philosophique de Se/ne\que, in La langue
latine, langue de la philosophie, Paris-Rome 1992, 141-160), he could
at least have mentioned M. Armisen-Marchetti, Sapientiae facies: e/tude
sur les images de Se/ne\que, Paris 1989 (a book, devoted to the
imaginary, and therefore intended not only for classical philologists,
but also useful to students and historians of philosophy), or, in the
English-speaking ambit, the recent paper of H. Hine, Poetic Influence
on Prose: The Case of the Younger Seneca, in Aspects of the Language of
Latin Prose, ed by T. Reinhardt, M. Lapidge, et all., Oxford 2005,
211-237. As for the numerous poetic quotations, one should have been
referred to G. Mazzoli, Seneca e la poesia, Milano 1970.

9.   Cf. A. Traina, Lo stile "drammatico", 39 f.; L. Anneo Seneca, Le
Consolazioni. A Marcia. Alla madre Elvia. A Polibio, introduzione,
traduzione e note di A. Traina, Milano 2004 (1987 1st ed.), 24-28.

10.   Due to their large size, letters 94 and 95 (book XV)--a diptych
on moral rules and principles--are omitted; for these letters we
dispose of the thorough commentary by Maria Bellincioni (Brescia 1979),
which could have been usefully mentioned in the bibliography. Inwood
has broadly discussed the two letters in chapter 4 of his Reading
Seneca, 115 ff.

11.   Select Letters of Seneca, edited with introductions and
explanatory notes by W. C. Summers, London 1910; Seneca, 17 Letters,
with translation and commentary by C. D. N. Costa, Warminster 1988.

12.   G. Allegri, Progresso verso la virtus. Il programma della Lettera
87 di Seneca, Cesena 2004; Lucio Anneo Seneca. Ad Lucilium epistula 85,
a cura di R. Marino, Palermo 2005.

13.   Inwood translates this whole letter, the most famous of Seneca's
epistolography, in the Introduction (pp. xx-xxi). Let us compare
Inwood's version, with Gummere's almost classic one (Seneca, Ad
Lucilium Epistulae Morales, with an English translation by R. M. G.,
voll. I-III, Cambridge-London 1913-1925, I, 3): "Continue to act thus,
my dear Lucilius set yourself free for your own sake; gather and save
your time, which till lately has been forced from you, or filched away,
or has merely slipped from your hands. Make yourself believe the truth
of my words, that certain moments are torn from us, that some are
gently removed, and that others glide beyond our reach. The most
disgraceful kind of loss, however, is that due to carelessness. The
most disgraceful kind of loss, however, is that due to carelessness.
Furthermore, if you will pay close heed to the problem, you will find
that the largest portion of our life passes while we are doing ill, a
goodly share while we are doing nothing, and the whole while we are
doing that which is not to the purpose".

14.   Gummere's translation (II, 299) is more involved: "Satiety, I
think, is the limit to our eating or drinking. A eats more and B eats
less; what difference does it make. Each is now sated. Or A drinks more
and B drinks less; what difference does it make? Each is no longer
thirsty. Again, A lives for many years and B for fewer". On this text,
see A. Traina, Lo stile "drammatico", 107.

15.   The translation of "disuse" for the Latin situs seems a little
thin: following OLD (situs 2.b, p. 1775 f.), rather than the bare sense
of "neglect", it seems to focus on its effects, the "physical
deterioration, or the signs of it, resulting from disuse, ...
(associated w. old age, or antiquity; transf., as affecting wds,
usages, etc.)" the "decay".

16.   With reference to this epistle, see S. Maso, Lo sguardo della
verita\. Cinque studi su Seneca, Venezia 1999 (also in French transl:
Le regard de la verite/. Cinq e/tudes sur Se/ne\que, Paris 2006), 144
f.

17.   The bibliography could be integrated with the observations of A.
Setaioli in his monograph Seneca e i Greci. Citazioni e traduzioni
nelle opere filosofiche, Bologna 1988, both for the general discussion
about the two epistles (cf. part. pp. 126-140, 158-164, 505-510), and
for the analysis of individual passages, like the quotation from
Heraclitus B 492 DK in epist. 58,23 (pp. 91-94), or the references to
Posidonius and Antipater of Tarsus in epist. 87, 38-40 (pp. 300-303).

18.   For instance the classification of six modes of being does not
precisely correspond with the actual Platonic doctrine (cf. A.
Setaioli, Seneca e i Greci, 138), and this permits Inwood (in Sedley'
footseps: cf. D. S., Stoic Metaphysics at Rome, in R. Salles [ed.],
Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought, Oxford 2005, 117-142)
to underline the way Seneca deals with Plato and the "reinvigorated
Platonism of his days" (p. 108, and cf. p. 124).

19.   Withoutthe Latin text, a list of divergencies from the OCT text
would have been useful.

20.   M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum libri III, ed. by A.S. Pease,
Cambridge 1955, vol. I, 143-145.

21.   Cf. Chrysipp. eth. 146 SVF II 44 <greek>w(s nomi/zousin oi( a)po\
th=s *Stoa=s, fu/sei, mimoumenwn tw=n prw/twn fwnw=n ta\ pra/gmata,
kaq' w(=n ta\ o)no/mata, kaqo\ kai\ stoixei=a/ tina th=s e)tumologi/as
ei)sa/gousin</greek>, "as the Stoics hold, by nature, the first
utterance being imitations of the things described and becoming their
names (in accordance with which they introduce certain etymological
principles" (transl. Chadwick).

22.   On this topic, see A. Setaioli, Seneca e i Greci, 33-43; Seneca e
gli arcaici, in A. S. (ed.), Seneca e la cultura, Napoli 1991, 33-45,
reprinted in A. S., Facundus Seneca. Aspetti della lingua e
dell'ideologia senecana, Bologna 2000, 220-231.

23.   As regards the correspondence between <greek>oi)kei=on</greek>
and accommodatum ad naturam, cf. Ac. 2,38 nam quo modo non potest
animal ullum non adpetere id quod adcommodatum ad naturam adpareat
(Graeci id <greek>oi)kei=on</greek> appellant), sic non potest obiectam
rem perspicuam non adprobare; cf. anche nat. deor. 1,104; fin. 4,43;
4,46; commendatio in Planc. 31, fin. 5,33; 5,40; 5,46.

24.   See C. Moreschini, Osservazioni sul lessico filosofico di
Cicerone, ASNP s. III, 9 (1979) 99-178, in part. pp. 126-30, M.
Armisen-Marchetti, Sapientiae facies, 213 f., as well as R. Fischer, De
usu vocabulorum apud Ciceronem et Senecam Graecae philosophiae
interpretes, Freiburg im Breisgau 1914, 93 f. For the synonymous cura
sui, see also my Aspetti della cura sui in Seneca morale, in Cultura e
Promozione Umana. La cura del corpo e dello spirito nell'antichita\
classica e nei primi secoli cristiani, a c. di E. Dal Covolo--I.
Giannetto, Troina 1998, 115-122.

25.   See M. Zimmermann--S. Panayotakis--et all., Apuleius Madaurensis,
Metamorphoses. Books IV 28-35, V-VI 1-24. The Tale of Cupid and Psyche,
Groningen 2004, 249, and the two papers of L. Alfonsi, Lucifugi viri.
Nota a Rutilio Namaziano, A&R 36 (1961) 98 f. and Su 'Luctifuga', Aevum
41 (1967) 157.

26.   Cf. B. Axelson, Neue Senecastudien. Textkritische Beitraege zu
Senecas Epistulae morales, Lund-Leipzig 1939, n. 49 p. 219, and
Thesaurus linguae Latinae VII/2,1712,8 ff.