BMCR 2009.07.24: Noe on Reeve, Plato: Republic

C.D.C. Reeve (trans.), Plato: Republic.  Indianapolis:  Hackett
Publishing Company, 2005.  Pp. 392.  ISBN 0872207366.  $10.95.

Reviewed by David C. Noe, Calvin College ([email protected])
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Table of Contents (http://books.google.com/books?id=bRgAY8JArckC)

[The reviewer apologizes to the author for this review's extreme
delay.]

In 1992 Reeve recast G.M.A. Grube's well-known translation of the
Republic for Hackett. The reception that work received apparently
encouraged Reeve to embark on his own version, for as he says in the
work's introduction the "...desire to have a translation of my own
proved too strong" [viii]. The result is the present volume, from the
same publisher, which he hopes "improves on existing translations"
[ibid.]

In a brief paragraph in the preface, Reeve explains succinctly his
method as follows: "Every translation, even the most self-consciously
and flat-footedly slavish, is somewhat interpretative. There is no
avoiding that. But I have tried to make this one as uninterpretative
[sic] and close to the original as possible." [ibid.] He proceeds to
list the one "conscious deviation" from this method, namely recasting
oblique speech as direct, and cites Eucleides from the Theatetus as
support. Reeve says that "Decades of teaching the Republic have
persuaded me that the minimal loss in literalness involved in adopting
Eucleides' stratagem is more than made up for in readability and
intelligibility" [ibid.] BMCR readers may be more inclined to fault
Reeve for striving for literalness than for accommodating his  diction
to English ears. Although this is not the venue for an extended
discussion of theories of translation, and the reader can judge Reeve's
success for himself later from the adduced passages, nevertheless we
find in Waterfield, Grube, and Shorey (arguably Reeve's chief
competitors) somewhat different approaches.[[1]].

Reeve devotes eighteen pages (ix-xxvii) to a helpful introduction, in
which he ably explains various aspects of the dialogue. Sections
include: brief biographical portions on Plato and Socrates; a thesis
statement and outline of the Republic; discussion of the theory of the
forms, The Forms and the Good, Specialization and the Structure of
Kallipolis, The Lies of the Rulers, Private Life and Private Property,
and Freedom and Autonomy. A good example of Reeve's even-handed
approach, and also his care not to corrupt student's perceptions before
they have encountered the text directly, is found in this final
section, where he writes: "A person's needs, wants, and interests are
determined by the natural genetic lottery, by education and upbringing,
and by actual circumstances. They also depend on his beliefs, which in
turn depend to some extent on the same factors as do his needs, wants,
and interests themselves" (xxv). At the conclusion of the same section,
Reeve provides a nice summary evaluation of what he believes to be the
dialogue's merits: "...even if we retain our liberal suspicion about
the possibility of a science of values, we might still, by coming to
see merit in the idea of deliberative freedom, also come to see the
Republic, not as predominantly a totalitarian hymn to the benefits of
repression and unfreedom, but as an attempt to design a city whose
members enjoy as much real happiness, and as much real freedom, as
possible"(xxvii).

A very select (two-page) bibliography follows, as well as competent,
one-paragraph synopses of each book of the dialogue. Finally, there is
a brief note to the reader explaining that Stephanus page numberings
are taken from Burnet, while S.R. Slings' text was employed as a basis
for the translation.

The footnotes provided to the text of the translation itself are modest
but still valuable. Readers can form some sense of their frequency by
noting that they range from a total of 29 in book I to 68 in book III.
Many simply send the reader to the glossary (e.g. pp. 3, 5, 6, 7, 11,
13, etc.) Some provide helpful references to passages outside the text
(e.g. note 12 to Odyssey 19 on p. 9) or are intra-textual (e.g. note
19, p. 19). Still others provide helpful clarification.[[2]] A very few
of these notes are argumentative in nature,[[3]] and some are extensive
and erudite.[[4]] Following the text there is a short Glossary of
Terms, with most English terms paired with Greek originals in
parentheses.[[5]] The volume concludes with a combined Glossary and
Index of Names, and a very thorough and useful General Index.

On the whole the auxiliary elements are more complete than what one
finds in Waterfield or Grube, but very similar in scope and quality to
Bloom's Basic Books edition.

In order to give the reader some sense of the quality of Reeve's work
two representative passages are selected for comparison. The first is a
typically stichomythic portion from Book 6.

Reeve (201) construes the conversation between Socrates and Adeimantus
on the guardian's interaction with the constitution as follows:


S: But won't our constitution be perfectly ordered if such a guardian,
one who knows these things, oversees it?

A: It is bound to be. But you  yourself, Socrates, do you say the good
is knowledge of pleasure, or is it something else altogether?

S: What a man! You made it good and clear long ago that other people's
opinions about these matters would not satisfy you.

A: Well, Socrates, it does not seem right to me for you to be willing
to state other people's convictions but not your own, when you have
spent so much time occupied with these matters.

S: What ? Do you think it is right to speak about things you do not
know as if you do know them?



In contrast, Waterfield (232) gives:


'So the constitution and organization of our community will be perfect
only if they are overseen by the kind of guardian who has this
knowledge, won't they?'

'Necessarily,'  he said. 'But Socrates, do you identify goodness with
knowledge or pleasure, or with something else?'

'Just listen to him!' I exclaimed. 'It's been perfectly obvious all
along that other people's views on the matter weren't going to be
enough for you.'

'That's because I don't think it's right, Socrates,' he said, ' for
someone who's devoted so much time to the matter to be in a position to
state others' beliefs, but not his own.'

'But you do think it's right,' I responded, 'for someone to talk as if
he knew what he doesn't know?'



Finally, the unrevised Grube (160-161) has:


Our constitution then will be perfectly ordered when such a man looks
after it -- that is, a man who has this knowledge.

Necessarily, he said, but you also, Socrates, must tell us whether you
consider the good to be knowledge, or pleasure, or something else.

What a man! I said. It has been clear for some time that the opinion of
others on this subject would not satisfy you.

Well, Socrates, he said, it does not seem right to me to be able to
tell the opinions of others and not one's own, especially for a man who
has spent so much time as you have occupying himself with this subject.

Why? said I. Do you think it right to talk about things one does not
know as if one knew them?



The similarities between Reeve and Grube are unmistakable nor
unexpected, as Reeve's revision of Grube must have contributed broadly
to his own sense of the translation. It is hoped the three provide the
reader with an opportunity to compare the virtues of idiomacy versus
literalness. Of them only Reeve has cast the exchange in direct speech,
and no doubt it will be a matter of taste whether Waterfield's more
conversational style suits.

A second sample for comparison is drawn from one of Plato's poetic
flights of fancy, the Myth of Er in Book 10. In a description of the
souls' journeys Reeve (320) offers:


Through one of the openings in the heavens and one in the earth, he saw
souls departing after judgment had been passed on them. Through the
other two, they were arriving. From the one in the earth they came up
parched and dusty, while from the one in the heavens they came down
pure. And the ones that had just arrived seemed to have come from a
long journey, and went off gladly to the meadow, like a crowd going to
a festival, and set up camp there.


Waterfield (372) provides:


'From where he was, he could see souls leaving, once they'd been
judged, by one or the other of the two openings in the sky and in the
earth, and he noticed how the other two openings were used too: one was
for certain souls, caked in grime and dust, to arise out of the earth,
while the other was for other, clean souls to come down out of the sky.
They arrived periodically, and he gained the impression that it had
taken a long journey for them to get there; they were grateful to turn
aside into the meadow and find a place to settle down. The scene
resembled a festival.'


Grube, again the closest to Reeve, has (257):


He said he saw souls leaving by either opening into the heavens and
into the earth after their judgment. As for the other two openings,
from one souls emerged from the earth covered with dust and dirt, by
the other souls came down from heaven clean. And all the time those who
arrived appeared to have been on a long journey; they gladly went and
camped in the meadow, like a festival crowd.


I suggest, uncontroversially, that the translator has more scope for
style and expression in these narrative portions than in the choppy
elenchus. In my estimation both Reeve and Grube provide lucid and
direct renditions that would serve well as a trot for the beginning
student or in a course on ancient philosophy. Waterfield, at least in
this passage, clearly makes a more successful attempt at readability by
breaking up longer clauses and offering more variety in Plato's strict
parallelism.

In conclusion, I believe Reeve's translation is highly commendable for
its student helps, simple accuracy, and affordability. It hews more
closely to Bloom (also in print) in its approach to translation, and
gives off the typical Hackett air of accessibility and ease of use.


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Notes:


1.   I have selected these three, from Oxford World's Classics, Loeb,
and Hackett respectively, as they are nearly ubiquitous. This selection
is not intended as criticism of the renderings of Cornford, Ferrari, or
Lee (all still in print as well) as each has its merits.

2.   "Euetheia, kakoetheia: Thrasymachus uses euetheia in the bad
sense, to mean stupidity. Socrates takes him to mean it in the good
sense of being straightforward, and so contrasts it with kakoetheia --
deviousness. See 400e1" p. 26.

3.   E.g. notes 13 (p. 45) and 24 (p. 57).

4.   The best examples are note 10 p. 241, and note 24 on p. 291.

5.   Here are two representative examples: "being (ousia) Abstract noun
derived from einai (to be). The being of (e.g.,) justice is what
justice really is" (p. 327); also "physical training (gymnastike)
Includes dance and training in warfare, as well as what we call
physical training. Effects characterized at 401d5-402d9, 410b10-412b1,
522a3-b1" (p. 328).