New IGC Report on Kyrgyzstan

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP MEDIA RELEASE


Kyrgyzstan's political crisis
Osh/Brussels, 20 August 2002: Stability in Kyrgyzstan is of fundamental
concern - especially as there are now 2,000 U.S. and other Coalition troops
located at Manas Aiport near the capital, Bishkek. However the increasingly
authoritarian behaviour of the Kyrgyz leadership has raised the level of
domestic tension sharply with mass protests taking place earlier this year.
Regional neighbours including Russia, China, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are
also watching recent developments with concern.

A new report from the International Crisis Group, Kyrgyzstan's Political
Crisis: An Exit Strategy, explains how the arrest of a popular politician,
Azimbek Beknazarov, in January 2002 led to the shooting of five protestors
in March. This sparked mass demonstrations which continued despite the
resignation of the entire government in May. It was only when the appeals
court lifted the charges against Beknazarov that the protestors went home.

ICG's Asia Program Director Robert Templer said: "The government was
astounded at the scale of popular discontent. But the ruling elite has lost
touch with the majority of the population and the increasingly autocratic
behaviour of President Askar Akaev is fuelling unrest. Long term stability
remains under threat unless underlying political and economic problems are
resolved. Many people were also emboldened by these events, and
demonstrations will likely be renewed".

Kyrgyzstan is entering a period of political uncertainty. President Akaev's
term comes to an end in 2005, and he has stated that he will not contest the
election. But he has no obvious successor, and there is an increasing
concentration of power around him, his family and close colleagues. The
opposition is becoming more radicalised, with many leaders demanding Akaev
resign immediately. The security forces' role is unpredictable - police have
gone on strike recently, and the levels of dissatisfaction are high - but so
are the levels of corruption and brutality. Popular protests and
geopolitical competition for influence in Kyrgyzstan are contributing to the
crisis.

ICG offers a strategy to avert wider violence and restore stability. This
report sets out recommendations for reform of laws on political parties, the
electoral commission and the media. It proposes as well a new law that would
encourage President Akaev to fuflfill his promise of retiring at the end of
his term by providing him and his family a degree of protection against
prosecution and stripping of assets.

ICG Central Asia Project Director David Lewis said: "Constitutional reform
is needed to reduce the president's powers and share power more equally with
the government and parliament. It is not acceptable that the leader controls
almost all key appointments. The president should serve as the neutral
arbiter of political disputes and wherever possible, decision making should
be devolved to local officials".

The U.S., EU and OSCE also need to work together more effectively and
develop a common platform to push for political reform. This should be based
on free elections, the reform of law enforcement agencies, reform of the
president's powers, and judicial independence. Assistance is also needed for
media reform to widen the scope for ownership and train journalists in the
state and independent sectors.


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MEDIA CONTACTS
Nathalie De Broyer (Brussels) +32-(0)2-502.90.38
Jennifer Leonard (Washington) +1-202-408 8012
All ICG reports are available on our website www.crisisweb.org
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KYRGYZSTAN'S POLITICAL CRISIS: AN EXIT STRATEGY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
ICG's first report on Kyrgyzstan, published in August 2001, highlighted the
potential for crisis facing the country. International attention was then
rarely focused on Central Asia but since September 2001 the region has
suddenly registered on policy-makers' agendas. Nearly 2,000 U.S. and
Coalition troops are now located at Manas Airport near Bishkek, as part of
the forces active in Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan is playing a key strategic
role in the region. Stability in this country is now of fundamental concern
to the international community but, since early 2002, it has declined
sharply.

The leadership has taken an increasingly authoritarian line towards the
opposition, perhaps believing that the U.S. presence gave it more leeway. A
popular deputy, Azimbek Beknazarov, was arrested in January 2002, and
several opposition newspapers were closed. His arrest provoked protests in
the south of the country, particularly in his home territory of Aksy
district, in Jalal-Abad province. In confrontations with protestors in
March, police shot dead five demonstrators, the first time political
protests had turned violent in Kyrgyzstan.

After the shootings, thousands of supporters of Beknazarov protested in the
South, demanding the dismissal of charges against him and the punishment of
those responsible for the killings. President Askar Akaev dismissed the
prime minister and interior minister in late May 2002, leading to the
resignation of the whole government. But the protests continued, with
demonstrators staging mass marches between southern cities. Tensions mounted
as their demands became more radical, including a call for Akaev's
resignation, and they threatened to march on Bishkek. It was only when the
appeal courts lifted the charges against Beknazarov that the protestors were
finally persuaded to go home.

This move calmed the situation temporarily, but the anger of the protestors
has hardly abated. And it has not solved the underlying political and
economic problems in Kyrgyzstan that have given rise to widespread
discontent. Long-term stability remains under threat unless a more
comprehensive review of policy is undertaken and serious measures introduced
to calm the situation. Many protestors have been emboldened by their
apparent success, and it is likely that demonstrations will be renewed. Even
if these grind to a halt, Kyrgyzstan is entering a period of uncertainty, as
it approaches the end of Akaev's term in office in 2005. As the struggle for
power gathers pace during this transition period, there is considerable
potential for further conflict.

The way the crisis develops depends on a number of factors, each of which
can contribute to escalation or de-escalation.

First, the political system and the struggle for power. The increasing
concentration of power around Akaev, his family and his close colleagues has
led to discontent among rival elites, who seek more participation in both
the political sphere and business. The usurpation of power in all branches
of government by the ruling elite has led to a crisis of legitimacy - in the
leadership, in the courts and in the political system itself. As the
leadership has gained more power, it has become more authoritarian in an
attempt to defend itself from rising criticism. This move towards
authoritarianism has effectively provoked the current crisis. Whether the
forthcoming struggle for power will remain peaceful depends on whether the
authorities accept the need for fundamental changes to the political system
and the electoral process.

Secondly, the opposition. Increasingly radicalised, it has little faith in
the present political system and now seeks the resignation of Akaev through
popular pressure. The president is unlikely to resign voluntarily, and the
result of such a strategy is likely to be more confrontation. Only a genuine
compromise by the authorities, involving efforts to deal with the roots of
the crisis in the political system and to take measures to guarantee free
elections in 2005 will dampen some of the radicalism of the opposition.

Thirdly, the security forces can either play a neutral role in preserving
order or become a political force in their own right. Recent strikes by the
police in the South and rising dissatisfaction among the security forces
represent a potential threat to peace. Reform of security structures is
badly needed.

Fourthly, popular protest, provoked by the increasing authoritarianism of
the government, but with its roots in a deep socio-economic crisis and a
lack of political representation, will continue regardless of agreements
made by elites, unless real attention is focused on the problems of the mass
of the population. This must cover political issues - winning back people's
faith in the constitutional process - economic issues - raising real living
standards - and social issues.

Fifthly, the growing geopolitical competition in Central Asia may also have
a destabilising impact. The U.S. military presence, attempts by Russia to
reassert its influence, and the fears of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and China
that any unrest could destabilise the region, will all affect the internal
situation in Kyrgyzstan. States with interests there can either use the
political situation to try and improve their own positions at the expense of
others, or can cooperate with the aim of promoting stability in the country.

These five factors will decide whether Kyrgyzstan's political crisis is
resolved through constitutional means, or develops into a wider crisis,
possibly degenerating into conflict. Since the implications of a conflict in
Kyrgyzstan are significant for the region as a whole, the interests of the
international community are in attempting to prevent any escalation of the
crisis.

The main effort in resolving the crisis must be made by Kyrgyzstan's
political forces. A genuine effort on the part of the elite to reach a 'new
deal' of power-sharing, in politics and in business, would limit the
potential for further unrest and ensure that future political struggles
remain within the constitutional framework. But the international community
can play a significant role in promoting and supporting such a deal, and
making clear to the leadership that future political, economic and strategic
relationships depend on real measures being taken.

The international community should become actively engaged in pushing
political reform. Without it, economic assistance will at best be wasted,
and at worst contribute to the increasing divide between the rulers and the
ruled. A common platform among Western states and international
organisations should push for real implementation of policies that are
currently just government rhetoric. Continued inaction on the part of the
leadership poses a serious threat to stability in the country and to the
region as a whole.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the leadership of Kyrgyzstan

1. Re-establish faith in the electoral process by:

(a) reforming laws on political parties and on elections, ensuring that
technical issues, such as registration and internal party issues, or
financial declarations, cannot be used to disqualify opposition candidates;

(b) reforming the Central Electoral Commission to include all political
forces, by removing the right of the president to appoint members,
increasing representation of opposition groups, and reducing the power of
the chairman;

(c) providing a proper legal basis for NGOs willing to monitor elections and
welcoming international monitor missions;

(d) seeking, on the basis of such changes, a public commitment by all
political forces to contest for power only through the electoral process;
and

(e) restricting presidential powers to use referenda, which in the past have
been abused to extend Akaev's term of office.

2. Institute constitutional reforms to reduce the strength of the presidency
so that power is shared more equally also with the government and
parliament, ensuring that:

(a) the president can serve as a neutral arbiter of political disputes;

(b) the parliament has the power to approve all government and presidential
decrees; and

(c) the number of presidential appointments is cut back sharply, with
parliament and a professionally competent judicial council approving all
appointments of judges.

(d) when and where possible, power is decentralised to elected local
officials in a graduated process, the pace of which should depend upon the
training and development of better qualified and competent individuals and a
system to hold them accountable.

3. Implement reforms of law enforcement agencies designed to regain popular
trust in the police, while making it a priority that they are adequately
funded and trained.

4. Abandon attempts to pass a law on political extremism and to create
superfluous bodies such as a Council for Democratic Security;

5. Adopt a package of laws to ease the transition of power, including:

(a) an amnesty on financial crimes associated with privatisation, corruption
and illegal business practices, that would lead to the release of Feliks
Kulov and provide a measure of protection for the presidential family; and

(b) a law providing the first president of Kyrgyzstan legal immunity and
guarantees of security when he leaves office.

To the Opposition

6. Develop real strategies of political and economic development of the
country over the long term, rather than concentrating on short-term
political gains.

7. Unite around a public commitment to ensuring free and fair elections as
the only route to a peaceful transfer of power and cooperate with the
government and parliament to develop laws that will allow this to happen.

8. Develop political parties as engines of change rather than the present
concentration on individuals, human rights organisations, and committees.

9. Support new laws to enable a peaceful transfer of power, including an
amnesty on financial crimes associated with privatisation and guarantees of
security for the president and his family;

To the International Community

10. Develop a common platform among the U.S., the EU and the OSCE to push
for political reform, based on:

(a) a commitment by all political forces to free elections;

(b) a reform of law enforcement agencies;

(c) a process of constitutional reform that shifts power from the presidency
equally to other institutions; and

(d) a reform of the judiciary aimed at increasing its independence.

11. Provide financial and technical assistance to underpin these reforms, if
it is clear that there is real political will behind them.

12. Provide assistance to widen the scope and ownership of the media and to
reform the state media so that it offers broader, independent news coverage,
and train journalists in both the independent and state sectors.

13. Link further financial assistance, including assistance from
international financial institutions (IFIs), to effective implementation of
changes in the political system, without which economic development is
unlikely;

To the OSCE

14. Offer a substantial increase in resources, including personnel, to
assist in a wider program of political and economic reform.

Osh/Brussels, 20 August 2002