I-D Action: draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-01.txt

Internet-Draft draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-01.txt is now available.

   Title:   ADS-B Authentication
   Authors: Robert Moskowitz
            José M. Fernandez
            Mikaëla Ngamboé
            Stuart W. Card
            Adam Wiethuechter
   Name:    draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-01.txt
   Pages:   42
   Dates:   2026-07-30

Abstract:

   The Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a
   surveillance technology mandated in many airspaces.  It is now widely
   deployed but suffers a lack of security and privacy.  From a security
   point of view, it is relatively easy to spoof the ADS-B messages.
   With the appropriate readily available hardware and software.  From a
   privacy point of view, all the messages contain the aircraft’s
   assigned 24-bit ICAO address, which makes it easy to link to data
   about the aircraft, in particular to know when a particular aircraft
   has flown and where to.  In addition, the main transmission medium
   utilized for ADS-B, i.e. the 1090 MHz frequency used by Extended
   Squitter (1090ES), is approaching saturation in some parts of the
   world with ADS-B and other protocol messages, resulting in packet
   loss in certain areas [RF_Usage].

   This paper presents the IETF TESLA protocol along with X.509
   certificates issued by ICAO member states for each aircraft to
   authenticate all ADS-B messaging.  It leverages the 8PSK phase
   overlay (PO) scheme proposed in the Minimum Operational Performance
   Standards (MOPS) for ADS-B (RTCA [DO-260C]), which enables 1090ES
   ADS-B transmissions to convey three times more information, to
   support the transmission of the extra security information required
   by the authentication scheme.  By doing so, the impact of
   authentication on channel usage is negligible.  Beyond message
   authentication, this scheme protocol has two important additional
   benefits: 1) the possibility to implement a Flight Authorization
   scheme, allowing ATC and intercepting aircraft to not only
   authenticate an aircraft but to verify that it is authorizes to
   conduct that flight and 2) a methodology for adequately protecting
   the privacy by assigning rotating 24-bit identifiers to designated
   aircraft, while maintaining the possibility to (blindly) authenticate
   their ADS-B transmissions.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-01.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-01

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


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