I-D Action: draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-02.txt

[email protected] Fri, 14 Aug 2026 10:46:25 -0700
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.announce
Message-ID <178672958527.111823.3180590134315309032@dt-datatracker-7c6ddbc678-86d5j>
Internet-Draft draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-02.txt is now available.

   Title:   ADS-B Authentication
   Authors: Robert Moskowitz
            José M. Fernandez
            Mikaëla Ngamboé
            Stuart W. Card
            Adam Wiethuechter
   Name:    draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-02.txt
   Pages:   46
   Dates:   2026-08-14

Abstract:

   Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) is a
   surveillance technology mandated in many airspaces.  It is now widely
   deployed but suffers from a lack of security and privacy.  From a
   security point of view, it is relatively easy to spoof ADS-B messages
   with readily available hardware and software.  From a privacy point
   of view, every ADS-B message contains the aircraft's assigned 24-bit
   ICAO address, a unique identifier that can be cross-referenced with
   external databases (e.g. aircraft registries) to reveal the owner,
   and can be used to track when and where a specific aircraft has
   flown.  In addition, the main transmission medium used for ADS-B, the
   1090 MHz frequency, on which messages are broadcast using the
   Extended Squitter (1090ES) format, is approaching saturation in some
   parts of the world due to the volume of ADS-B and other protocol
   messages, resulting in packet loss in certain areas.

   This paper presents the IETF TESLA protocol along with X.509
   certificates issued by ICAO member states for each aircraft to
   authenticate all ADS-B messaging.  It leverages the 8PSK phase
   overlay (PO) scheme proposed in the Minimum Operational Performance
   Standards (MOPS) for ADS-B (RTCA [DO-260C]), which enables 1090ES
   ADS-B transmissions to convey three times more information, to
   support the transmission of the extra security information required
   by the authentication scheme.  By doing so, the impact of
   authentication on channel usage is negligible.  Beyond message
   authentication, this scheme protocol has two important additional
   benefits: 1) the possibility to implement a Flight Authorization
   scheme, allowing ATC and intercepting aircraft to not only
   authenticate an aircraft but to verify that it is authorizes to
   conduct that flight and 2) a privacy-preserving methodology that
   assigns random 24-bit identifiers to designated aircraft while still
   enabling blind authentication of their ADS-B transmissions.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-02.html

A diff from the previous version is available at:
https://author-tools.ietf.org/iddiff?url2=draft-moskowitz-ads-b-auth-02

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


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