I-D Action: draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00.txt

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Message-ID <178817636753.330138.3540315949722008199@dt-datatracker-6669c7b496-4m6kd>
Internet-Draft draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00.txt is now
available.

   Title:   Beyond Attestation: An Execution-Finality Architecture for Controlling Release and Limiting Unauthorized Extraction and Distillation of Sensitive OpenAI and Anthropic Claude Model Information
   Author:  Sangam Das
   Name:    draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00.txt
   Pages:   33
   Dates:   2026-08-31

Abstract:

   Anthropic and OpenAI already ship inference interfaces richer than
   raw completions -- log-probabilities, embeddings, hidden states,
   intermediate activations, KV-cache material, and diagnostic output
   are all in production today.  Each is a channel an adversary, a
   compromised partner integration, or a stolen enterprise seat can use
   to reconstruct, steal, or distill a model far faster than by scraping
   ordinary text output.  In this document, a "release" is any point at
   which such information leaves the protected execution environment and
   becomes usable outside it: returned to a caller, cached, forwarded,
   or otherwise materialized.  The operational question this document
   answers is narrow: given that the caller is authenticated and the
   workload is attested, is this specific release still authorized to
   happen right now?

   Authentication establishes who is asking.  Confidential computing and
   remote attestation establish whether the execution environment is
   trustworthy.  Neither establishes whether this particular release, of
   this particular artifact, at this particular moment, should be
   allowed to cross the protected boundary.  A valid API key, a genuine
   TEE, and a passing Attestation Result are all fully compatible with
   an unauthorized bulk-extraction run already in progress.  Rate
   limits, output filtering, and anomaly detection operate after the
   release has already happened; they make extraction easier to notice,
   not harder to complete.

   This document specifies an execution-finality architecture that makes
   release control a technical precondition rather than a monitoring
   layer: computation is separated from authority to release, every
   sensitive result is held as a non-effective Candidate Release, and
   release becomes possible only after release-specific validation,
   rollback-resistant extraction-state evaluation, bounded
   authorization, and verification at a controlled Finality Sink.
   Because release authority is bound to rollback-resistant, atomically
   consumed extraction state rather than to a bearer credential, the
   volume of privileged teacher signal an adversary can accumulate
   through the governed path is capped by authorized state transitions,
   not by request volume or attacker persistence alone.  The mechanism
   is not claimed to prevent all forms of model distillation; its
   objective is to make unauthorized or excessive extraction of
   privileged model information structurally harder to complete, not
   merely easier to detect afterward.

The IETF datatracker status page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction/

There is also an HTML version available at:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-das-rats-openai-anthropic-extraction-00.html

Internet-Drafts are also available by rsync at:
rsync.ietf.org::internet-drafts


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