Re: Welcome to the ietf-apps-tls mailing list

Date: Tue, 6 May 1997 19:20:35 -0700
From: "Paul E. Hoffman" <[email protected]>

> At 6:26 PM -0700 5/6/97, Dennis Glatting wrote:
>
> >It may be worthwhile to note the potential impact of a MIM
> >altering the TLS keyword parameters, e.g., nuke "TLS.10" and
> >"SSL3.0" in lieu of "SSL2.0", or nuke the TLS keyword
> >altogether.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by "impact".  Section 5 says:
> :After the TLS handshake has been completed, both parties MUST decide
> :whether or not to continue based on the authentication and privacy
> :achieved.
> This is a MUST, not a SHOULD. A MIM altering the keyword would still have
> to get by this final check.
>

If two parties permit a given set of all types, e.g., they
support all three types, and the set is altered by a MIM, then the
selected type will probably be the strongest of the altered
set. If two parties support non-TLS connections and TLS
connections and the TLS keyword is nuked, then a non-TLS
connection may be established.  Of course, a party could have
knowledge of the other's capabilities, which is certainly
possible, but does not scale.


-dpg