Re: sender rewriting scheme

"Gordon Fecyk - Home" <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Is there a better solution to the .forward problem than
> > sender rewriting?
> 
> Alan answered it best:  Nope, otherwise we're back to Square One.

  Was I that articulate?  Hmm...

  Since the scope of the problem we're addressing is EHLO/HELO, and
MAIL FROM, then .forward shouldn't be an issue:

  a) EHLO/HELO contains a valid FQDN for the MTA
  b) MAIL FROM contains the username at that domain who consented
     to forwarding the message.

  I see much of the current argument around these issues as failures
in the original design/spec of the protocols.  e.g. See:

	http://lists.insecure.org/lists/bugtraq/2002/Oct/0271.html

  The RFC's say things like "the implementation must properly handle
christmas tree packets", but they don't define what they mean by
"properly".  Fear, fantasy, and confusion follows.


  One of the goals of this effort should be to not only define the
scope of the problem we're trying to solve, but also *why* we're
trying to solve it, and *what* is wrong with the original specs.

  e.g. an MTA which sends:

EHLO [127.0.0.1]

  is conformant to RFC 2821.  Yet it's behaviour is obviously nonsense.

  Alan DeKok.