Re: Email Web of Trust
Yakov Shafranovich <[email protected]> Tue, 16 Mar 2004 00:32:26 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.asrg.smtpverify |
|---|---|
| Organization | SolidMatrix Technologies, Inc. |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Alan DeKok wrote: > Yakov Shafranovich <[email protected]> wrote: > >>What I am looking for is a one or two sentence problem statement for >>this concept, similar to what we have in the LMAP document: >> >>" LMAP attacks the forgery problem by checking that the host >> from which the message was sent is authorized to send mail >> using the a domain in the message's envelope. >>" > > > The web of trust attacks the spam problem by collating information > across multiple recipients, to determine the probability that a > particular SMTP sending IP is sending spam. This probability may be > calculated (with some level of confidence), even if a particular > recipient has not had prior interaction with a particular sender. > I would rather not restrict it to IPs, but rephrase "SMTP sending IP" as "MTAs". If somekind of LMAP-like scheme is implemented, it is possible that this web of trust can be used for domains as well. I also don't like the phrase "attacks the spam problem". I would rather see something like "helps to fight the spam problem" since it makes it sound like a silver bullet although I could be wrong. > > It won't stop spam, but it will give people more information than > they have today. > Agree. We will have to determine at some point whether the cost of implementing such web vs. the benefit of using it makes it worthwhile. > >>What I am looking for is something similar for this. Another important >>point is what John mentioned - ISP MTAs which are sending out spam along >>with legit email. For these, unless the percentage of spam becomes >>really big, the web of trust will not help with. > > > Why not? If I know that an ISP sends out 1% spam by accident, I can > deal with it. If I know that an ISP sends out 50% spam because > they're unwilling to solve the problem, I'm better able to deal with > the traffic. > > Again, the trust is not, and can not, be a simple binary metric. > Any measure of trust with is solely "trusted/untrusted" is doomed to > fail. > > And the spam problem is not known ISP's sending small volumes. It's > substantially unknown people sending large volumes. > I was refering specifically to the use of neutral metrics - there is not way to stop spam coming from an ISPs mail server simply by knowing that this is a well known MTA. If you use some kind of trust metric, then it would be possible actually to do more. Of course that brings us to the question of trust. > >>Therefore, IMHO such "web of trust" is more geared towards reducing >>the problem with hijacked computers, or IPs/domains that have are >>not supposed to be MTAs. If this in fact is true, than a web of >>trust method might not be better than other methods to address the >>problem. > > > You could use a whitelist. But how would you prime it, if not with > some kind of web of data? > I will leave it for now, I can't think of other methods offhand. But I think that we will revisit this issue in the future. Yakov