Re: rDNS and cache issues, was How will we manage IPv6 spam?
Matthias Leisi <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.asrg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CALgnk9oddhOwyuw085963t0CMA6oqEUt_WvuEMST1i5b+ffVLQ@mail.gmail.com> |
On Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 11:08 AM, Emanuele Balla (aka Skull) <[email protected]> wrote: > Note anyway that we're only considering the case of positive DNS answers > (or listed entities), but I'd expect that most of the cache blowup > problem will be generated by NXDOMAINs, at list at first. > We have much less control on that... There may be slight differences if we consider the wider case of DNSxLs in general, ie including whitelists which may have different cache characteristics. At dnswl.org, we can generally live with TTLs in the order of magnitude of days (although we make them shorter so that we can remove/change entries reasonably fast). At present, we have ~180k IPs listed (IPv4, there are only a handful of IPv6 addresses which we do not yet publish due to the unclarity about how this should be done). There are potentially another 100k or so IPs which we do not list (yet) for various reasons (time to edit them, questionable source, ...). The data changes very slowly, most often somewhere between 50 and 250 changes per day (including score changes etc, not necessarily removed/added IPs); some exceptional days may have 1'000 or 2'000 changes. As long as operators of "legitimate" sending mail systems do not change the distribution/IP patterns of their mailservers dramatically in an IPv6 world (and there are few reasons why they should do so), there is little impact on DNS infrastructure (auth + cache). For the case of abusive behaviour (ie, spammer using vast pools of IP addresses, eg > 10^3 IP addresses, either snowshoe-like or in cannon style), DNS caches will only blow if receiving systems are "dumb", ie do not handle dDoS-like patterns appropriately. That's already an issue today, and will only be "somewhat worse" in an IPv6 world. -- Matthias