Re: DMARC

On Tue 19/Mar/2013 01:24:44 +0100 Dotzero wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2013 at 6:53 PM, Neil Schwartzman <[email protected]> wrote:
>> Some people think DMARC will save email (from what?) others think
>> it breaks email because of mailing lists such as this one (which
>> are a rare anachronism say some).
>>
>> Discuss.
>>
>> {waves at new sub Murray}
> 
> DMARC is a tool that allows domain owners or agents to do a couple of
> things - if you want saving, seek religious counsel.
> 
> 1) DMARC enables authentication failure reporting from mailbox
> providers that choose to participate. This provides insight into mail
> claiming to be from them for senders that never had this sort of
> visibility before.

That is its astounding, revolutionary feature, IMHO.  With that
feedback, even faint hearts can specify strong policies.

> 2) DMARC provides a domain owner or agent the opportunity to express
> (negative) policy regarding mail that fails to validate for either
> aligned SPF or DKIM. This ability to express policy indicating a
> receiver should either quarantine or reject (depending on the policy
> published) provides protection against direct domain abuse.

That's a confusing repetition of already available policies, dkim=all
and -all.  Rejecting is never mandatory, thus the ability to whitelist
failed authentications with one another has always been granted.  For
a simpler-is-better approach, message disposition specifications could
have limited to bolstering and clarifying existing policies.