Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd-04: (with COMMENT)
"Stephen Farrell" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.bmwg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd-04: No Objection When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Just an idle thought... Given what we've learned about tests, car manufs and diesel engines recently, I wonder if it'd be a good idea for the security considerations sections of this kind of RFC to consider how a DUT implementer might cheat? In this case, I guess there could be a scenario where the "clear the NC" operation is not really done (for a short time, after a test pattern has been observed recently) so that the DUT appears to perform better during tests. I'd guess that some of the folks designing these tests thought about some of that, but it might be no harm to start writing that down as well. (Note this really is just a suggestion, I'm not complaining at all. OTOH, while it'd be a bit of work, it might be fun of a kind:-)