Re: Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd-04: (with COMMENT)
Stephen Farrell <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.bmwg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Al, On 15/02/17 03:25, MORTON, ALFRED C (AL) wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: bmwg [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Stephen Farrell >> Sent: Tuesday, February 14, 2017 8:45 PM >> To: The IESG >> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; MORTON, >> ALFRED C (AL); [email protected] >> Subject: [bmwg] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6- >> nd-04: (with COMMENT) >> >> Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for >> draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd-04: No Objection >> > ... >> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-bmwg-ipv6-nd/ >> >> >> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> COMMENT: >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> >> >> Just an idle thought... Given what we've learned about tests, >> car manufs and diesel engines recently, I wonder if it'd be a >> good idea for the security considerations sections of this >> kind of RFC to consider how a DUT implementer might cheat? >> In this case, I guess there could be a scenario where the >> "clear the NC" operation is not really done (for a short >> time, after a test pattern has been observed recently) so >> that the DUT appears to perform better during tests. I'd >> guess that some of the folks designing these tests thought >> about some of that, but it might be no harm to start writing >> that down as well. (Note this really is just a suggestion, >> I'm not complaining at all. OTOH, while it'd be a bit of >> work, it might be fun of a kind:-) >> >> > [ACM] > Long before the emission test scandals, we had discussions on > manipulation of measurements in the context of the LMAP BoF. > Henning Schulzrinne wisely pointed-out that there are > engineering problems, and then there are lawyer problems. > > We subsequently wrote the LMAP charter to say: > "Protection against the intentional or malicious insertion > of inaccuracies into the overall system or measurement > process (sometimes known as "gaming the system") is > outside the scope of work." > > thankfully participating in the I*E*TF > and leaving lawyer problems to the lawyers, I fully agree that attempting to describe lawyer problems wouldn't be a good plan. But, there are engineering issues here that could maybe be usefully described too and it's only the latter that I was interested in. As you say, I do think that folks designing these benchmarks do consider cheating DUT implementers at least a bit, so the question is mostly if it's interesting to document some of that thought. I'd find that interesting and suspect it might be useful for those implementing or carrying out tests. Cheers, S. > Al > _______________________________________________ bmwg mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/bmwg
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