Re: [dnsext] DNS vulnerabilities

Tony Finch wrote:

> I have the beginnings of a solution to this problem. It is based on using
> tlsdate, which gets the time from a server with minimal risk of
> interference by a man-in-the-middle.

TLS is another PKI and is inherently insecure as CAs can be
compromised.

As David Conrad wrote in this thread:

> How does a 32 or 64 bit message ID protect you from on-path
> MITM/injection attacks?

we should assume local ISP can be compromised.

Then, as compromising a CA is just as easy as compromising
an ISP, PKIs, including but not limited to DNSSEC and TLS,
are inherently insecure.

Worse, tlsdate has a chicken and egg problem. Without secure
clock, how can you be sure that certificate for tlsdate is
still valid?

> If you get the time from several
> diverse servers you can be very sure you have the right time if enough
> of them agree.

It is not more secure than using multiple NTP servers with
plain NTP.

						Masataka Ohta

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