Re: Authenticated denial of existence...
Matthijs Mekking <[email protected]> Thu, 21 Nov 2013 08:31:23 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.dnsext |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi, On 11/20/2013 06:53 PM, Dave Lawrence wrote: > Tony Finch writes: >>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-gieben-auth-denial-of-existence-dns/ >> >> A really nice and helpful document. > > Agreed. Really well put-together. I do like the previously mentioned > ideas of including a bit about RFC 4470 and a few short words on > alternatives to managing the nsec3 hash space (like Kaminsky's). > Appendix is fine to not disrupt the flow, and it probably doesn't > really need more than a paragraph or so for each. Thanks. Miek and I are going to cover the topic. > Section 3[.0] should probably elaborate on this: > > When you are querying a name server for a record that actually > exists, a man-in-the-middle may replay that generic denial record > and it would be impossible to tell whether the response was genuine > or spoofed. > > especially when later on 3.2 says this: > > Therefore, the RRSIG's RDATA include a validity period (not visible > in the zone above), so that an attacker cannot replay this NXDOMAIN > response for "c.example.org" forever. > > which could easily leave the reader wondering, "so why doesn't having > a validity period on a generic denial record adequately address this?" > > I realize the answer is obvious to us, but it isn't obvious in the > document, which is meant to be accessible by people outside the > security sphere. > > Maybe this subtle would work? I'm not entirely sure how much it does > help, but does start to point in the right direction. > > When you are querying a name server for any record that actually > exists, a man-in-the-middle could replay that generic denial record > that is not limited in its scope and it would be impossible to tell > whether the response was genuine or spoofed. I agree. Thank you for providing text. Best regards, Matthijs > _______________________________________________ > dnsext mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext > _______________________________________________ dnsext mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext