Re: Authenticated denial of existence...
Jelte Jansen <[email protected]> Mon, 25 Nov 2013 16:55:47 +0100
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.dnsext |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On 11/25/2013 04:43 PM, Tony Finch wrote: > Miek Gieben <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Matthijs and I added an extra appendix to cover on-line signing and >> made some tweaks to the rest of the text. > > Looks good. > > A point I just noticed in section 3 which I think could do with > elaborating: > > Given all these troubles, why didn't the designers of DNSSEC go > for the (easy) route and allowed for on-line signing? Well, at > that time (pre 2000), on-line signing was not feasible with the > then current hardware. Keep in mind that the larger servers get > between 2000 and 6000 queries per second (qps), with peaks up to > 20,000 qps or more. Scaling signature generation to these kind of > levels is always a challenge. Another issue was (and is) key > management, for on-line signing to work you need access to the > private key(s). This is considered a security risk. > > I think it is worth saying that online signing makes it difficult to have > third party secondary authoritative servers, since they would need a copy > of the private ZSK. With normal DNSSEC, even with a dynamically updated > zone, the private keys do not need to be on a publicly accessible machine. > now that you quote it like that, I think that using 'allowed' in that first line is misleading; it's not so much that the protocol doesn't allow on-line signing, the requirement was that it didn't have to rely on it. Also, IIRC the preferred term was on-the-fly rather than on-line. Need to re-read doc :) Jelte _______________________________________________ dnsext mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/dnsext