[DNSOP] dnssec (Was: Re: [art] DNS-designated Public Key Authorities (DKA))

Ben Schwartz wrote in
 <CAOdQrVPXhvou8seFqC4zPiyYHOs_U+20je59rrUZ5LBdQxzQUQ@mail.gmail.com>:
 |On Sat, May 30, 2026 at 3:14 PM S Kishore <[email protected]> wrote:
 |...
 |> Just a point of clarification: DNSSEC is not mandatory in the draft; \
 |> it is recommended.
 |
 |Yes, but it needs to be mandatory in this design.  Otherwise, any
 |on-path attacker can replace the DKA TXT record with one that points
 |to the attacker's DKA, allowing them to impersonate all identities on
 |the victim domain.
 |
 |...
 |> A .well-known pointer would also not eliminate the underlying DNS \
 |> security dependency. A client still has to use DNS to reach the HTTPS \
 |> origin serving that .well-known resource, so absent DNSSEC, both \
 |> the DNS-based designation and the .well-known alternative remain \
 |> vulnerable to DNS redirection at discovery time.
 |
 |No, HTTPS is not vulnerable to "DNS redirection" of the client.  The
 |attacker first has to fool the Certificate Authority in order to get a
 |mis-issued certificate.

To me it seems all of DNS is highly suspicious unless DNSSEC usage
is omnipresent.

For example, a couple of weeks ago DENIC (manager of the .de top
domain) messed up their DNSSEC signature.
I was more than surprised to see that even the omnipresent and
omnipotent 8.8.8.8 nameservers, and more, do not even seem to
*verify* signatures at all.  (In fact i would have thought they
use protected zone transfers or what, at that scale and potency.)
Also other upstream servers/recursive resolvers do not even
verify.

So in the end it was my local dnsmasq cache producing failures
because of DNSSEC verification, which is why i first thought
something wrong.

In short: they hammered through bogus data for hours.

I have not been "cultivated asian", but "8" is precious, and that
is just bogus.  Not 8, anyhow.

 |...
 |> Control of an email address can be verified using existing Internet \
 |> mechanisms, in particular mailbox control and DKIM.
 |
 |I think the draft should also note the possibility of the DKA and
 |email host publishing key assignments by private arrangement.  For
 |email providers who already perform key management on behalf of the
 |accounts on the domain, this seems likely to be more reliable than the
 |"in band" mechanism.

I privately lost my teeth on bootstrapping, fwiw.
Personally i would feel best if i would have my own key that my
domain seller or top domain manager signs.

It is easy to create a certificate request, if only advised
humanly.  I was deeply disappointed when about 25 years ago the
new German passport did not come with "S/MIME and PGP for
everyone", plus a little booklet, you know.
I would always prefer to use it if only i could.
(In the meantime the corresponding thing luckily belongs a.k.a. is
owned by Germany again.  You know i hate the private sector where
it doesn't belong.  Sure, General Electric builds atomic bombs,
but that is how it is.)

I am thankful for ACME, not to be misunderstood.  I even do
  $SERVER["socket"] == ":80" {
          $HTTP["url"] =~ "^/\.well-known" {
                  url.redirect = ("" => "https://${url.authority}${url.path}${qsa}")
          }
  }
and it works (but sure: fwiw).

But i would never praise certificate authorities, especially given
that I as user have very little insight into which programs use
which CA pool comes from where.
It may be visualization and centralization of such is acceptable
to average users on a system sold by a big vendor, .. but i have
doubts.  (It definitely was terrifying ~15 years ago.)

DNSSEC with a local cache, that i possibly can look into etc, or
even (ha!), optionally, TOFU-hooked, that would be streamlined.
(It surely is hard to believe to get some nice user interface
given that firefox for example does not even offer a graspable
view on local data / cookies.)

 --End of <[email protected]\
 .com>

And those guys, for example, look up SPF and (RSA) DKIM.  It could
be they use 8.8.8.8 for that.

--steffen
|
|Der Kragenbaer,                The moon bear,
|der holt sich munter           he cheerfully and one by one
|einen nach dem anderen runter  wa.ks himself off
|(By Robert Gernhardt)

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