[DNSOP] Re: [art] Re: DNS-designated Public Key Author ities (DKA)

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On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 7:35 PM S Kishore <[email protected]> wrote:
...
> DKA is no more vulnerable than other DNS-designated domain services.

Yes, but it is more sensitive.  It purports to distribute keys
associated with some email address, not an attacker, for arbitrary
uses (including encryption of sensitive material and authentication of
access to accounts and services).

> A DNS-level DKA attack is a disruption vector, not a precision credential-theft vector.

No, it's a powerful impersonation vector for all identities on the
domain.  The claim that an attack might be detectable after it has
already been performed is (1) too late and (2) highly speculative.
The IETF normally assumes a much stronger threat model, especially in
the context of key distribution.

> A DKA can monitor its own DNS designation and detect unauthorized changes.

No, the attack can be scoped to specific victim clients.

> DKA redirection alone does not give the attacker access to encrypted content.

It effectively does.  Otherwise the keys aren't actually necessary and
we could dispense with DKA entirely.

> Mandating DNSSEC would create a deployment barrier.

Yes.  That intrinsic deployment barrier may explain why this
relatively obvious idea has not been substantially deployed even
though it has been technically feasible for decades.

--Ben

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