[DNSOP] Re: [Ext] draft-ietf-dnsop-delext-08 ietf last c all Artart review
Roy Arends <[email protected]> Tue, 14 Jul 2026 08:54:10 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.dnsop,gmane.ietf.apps-discuss |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
> On 11 Jul 2026, at 07:06, Jiankang Yao via Datatracker <[email protected]> wrote: > > Document: draft-ietf-dnsop-delext > Title: DNS Protocol Modifications for Delegation Extensions > Reviewer: Jiankang Yao > Review result: Almost Ready > > I am the assigned ART-ART reviewer for this draft. The Art Area > Review Team (ART-ART) reviews all IETF documents being processed > by the IESG. Please treat these comments just > like any other last call comments. > > Document: draft-ietf-dnsop-delext-08 > Reviewer: Jiankang Yao > Review Date: 2026-07-11 > > Summary: Almost Ready. > > This document specifies modifications to the DNS protocol to permit a range of > Resource Record types at delegation points. These modifications are proposed to > design to maintain compatibility with existing DNS resolution mechanisms. > > I think that this is a very big change to DNS. > DNS is very important to Internet. It needs very careful review from IETF. Dear Jiankang Yao, thank you for your review. I agree. This is a big change to the DNS, and I appreciate the call for careful review from the IETF. > One suggestion: > Section 4.1 specifies that authoritative servers omit NS RRsets and return only > Delegation Type RRsets in referrals when DE=1. This introduces ambiguous > caching behavior > for recursive resolvers in mixed deployment environments: > > A resolver may first receive a DE=1 referral for a zone (carrying Delegation > Type RRsets, no NS records), which it caches normally. A subsequent DE=0 or > DELEXT-unaware query for the identical zone will trigger a traditional referral > containing NS RRsets, populating the resolver cache with NS data. A Delegation-Extension-aware resolver consistently sends DNS requests with DE=1. There is no scenario where it sends subsequent requests with DE=0. > Section 5.2 prohibits caching NS records obtained from DE=1 referrals, > but the draft provides no clear rules governing NS records retrieved > via DE=0 queries or DELEXT-unaware queries that coexist with cached Delegation > Type RRsets for the same name. A Delegation-Extension-aware resolver has either NS (i.e. there are no DELEXT records for the delegation) or DELEXT records cached. > Since most real-world DNS clients may continue to send DE=0 or DELEXT-unaware > query queries long after DELEXT deployment, the specification needs additional > text to define resolver cache handling of NS RRsets. I’m afraid that the scenario you’ve described is not possible. EDNS information is not transient but hop by hop. A DE=0 request (or DE=1 for that matter) from a stub resolver has no influence on what the receiving resolver or forwarder sets in EDNS DE flags on subsequent upstream DNS requests. > One Question: Is this Potential DoS vulnerability from no cached NS fallback > under DE=1? > > Section 4.1 mandates authoritative servers omit NS RRsets in DE=1 referrals, It omits NS RRsets when DELEXT types are present. When there are no DELEXT types present, the authoritative server includes NS records. > and Section 5.2 forbids resolvers from caching NS records associated with DE=1 > delegations. That is correct. > If a DE=1 referral’s Delegation Type data fails to yield usable resolution > endpoints for any reason, the resolver holds no cached NS fallback records for > the zone example.com. That is correct. Section 5.2 goes on to explain why: "The purpose of this restriction is to avoid leakage of DNS messages over unencrypted transport (i.e., Do53) when servers, indicated by Delegation Types, fail to respond." > The DNS clients will try and try again since they can not get the right DNS > resolution of exaample.com. If the DNS client is a stub resolver, it will receive a SERVFAIL response from the Delegation-Extension-aware resolver. This is no different when a non-Delegation-Extension-aware resolver receives unusable NS records. > Do they open a denial-of-service attack? I do not see how. At least not worse than a traditional deployment of unreachable NS delegation points. Happy to discuss further, if I’m missing something. Warmly, Roy _______________________________________________ DNSOP mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
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