[DNSOP] PQ DNSSEC?

Hey all,

With various new regulatory timelines for valuable systems to be PQ by
2031, we're getting questions what we're looking at with DNSSEC. Looking
from afar (and please forgive me my ignorance) it doesn't look good. There's a
lot of academic investigation and experimentation (great), IETF
side-meetings, but no thrust or plans to any deployment; no adopted drafts
or BoFs.

If we care for PQ DNSSEC by 2031, what would be the most practical path? We
can't be too ambitious.

So what are we looking at? The only practical [1] signature scheme
available on this timeframe is ML-DSA-44 with 2,420 byte signatures and
1,322 byte public keys. We can't have authoritatives include these by
default: it'll break clients that can't fall back to TCP, or are buggy in
other ways.

Instead I suppose we have the client signal if it supports ML-DSA-44 [2],
and only in that case return those large RRSIGs. This allows for gradual
demployment, and only impacts those that care for PQ DNSSEC. While we wait
for the root to sign with ML-DSA-44, resolver can anchor on TLDs ML-DSA-44
keys.

In the right ballpark?

Best,

 Bas


[1] https://blog.cloudflare.com/ml-dsa-will-have-to-do/
[2] Should we repurpose draft-huque-dnssec-alg-nego?

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