[DNSOP] Re: PQ DNSSEC?

I am supportive of reviving algorithm negotiation draft - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huque-dnssec-alg-nego-03<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1ST79G3c1lLx7PRyhqhl4CSvZA1jqdEsLWmnQQL5Ia6uHCsnT3eEBrFchMALdvxWnFVn1lpabiDS8kT_yu4rojt1rondi6BQyalhrTd0GkyS8y0CWEpGlYor33flIIDdQvVfNXN0G51B7OwRyczZe2amvNmCJetmvbuAyxARdUXrN_mKyGhJHWorC-5F8QXrYCZ0dFofxJ0SBABiv3Ib6raAVwrMxP0IaP2CMmQiUibDTK_jtQH7YHEpx-NeBM-l4DEpd-XWzplAi4xKU22gkK7sGspOUzX0bKoRJJnTDMMiESsKFHDnpYDLgHTtJTzr0/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-huque-dnssec-alg-nego-03>, in anticipation of supporting multiple PQ DNSSEC algorithms as suggested in https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sheth-pqc-dnssec-strategy/. Happy to contribute/review as needed.

-Swapneel

From: Shumon Huque <[email protected]>
Date: Sunday, July 19, 2026 at 3:07 PM
To: Bas Westerbaan <[email protected]>
Cc: "[email protected]" <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [DNSOP] Re: PQ DNSSEC?


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On Sun, Jul 19, 2026 at 1:16 PM Bas Westerbaan <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Hey all,

With various new regulatory timelines for valuable systems to be PQ by 2031, we're getting questions what we're looking at with DNSSEC. Looking from afar (and please forgive me my ignorance) it doesn't look good. There's a lot of academic investigation and experimentation (great), IETF side-meetings, but no thrust or plans to any deployment; no adopted drafts or BoFs.

I agree that it's probably time to get PQ DNSSEC work officially into an IETF working group's charter.

If we care for PQ DNSSEC by 2031, what would be the most practical path? We can't be too ambitious.

So what are we looking at? The only practical [1] signature scheme available on this timeframe is ML-DSA-44 with 2,420 byte signatures and 1,322 byte public keys. We can't have authoritatives include these by default: it'll break clients that can't fall back to TCP, or are buggy in other ways.

Instead I suppose we have the client signal if it supports ML-DSA-44 [2], and only in that case return those large RRSIGs. This allows for gradual demployment, and only impacts those that care for PQ DNSSEC. While we wait for the root to sign with ML-DSA-44, resolver can anchor on TLDs ML-DSA-44 keys.

Selectively returning PQC signatures was in fact one of the use cases envisioned by that draft. It could be revived if there is renewed interest. (Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huque-dnssec-alg-nego-03<https://secure-web.cisco.com/1ST79G3c1lLx7PRyhqhl4CSvZA1jqdEsLWmnQQL5Ia6uHCsnT3eEBrFchMALdvxWnFVn1lpabiDS8kT_yu4rojt1rondi6BQyalhrTd0GkyS8y0CWEpGlYor33flIIDdQvVfNXN0G51B7OwRyczZe2amvNmCJetmvbuAyxARdUXrN_mKyGhJHWorC-5F8QXrYCZ0dFofxJ0SBABiv3Ib6raAVwrMxP0IaP2CMmQiUibDTK_jtQH7YHEpx-NeBM-l4DEpd-XWzplAi4xKU22gkK7sGspOUzX0bKoRJJnTDMMiESsKFHDnpYDLgHTtJTzr0/https%3A%2F%2Fdatatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-huque-dnssec-alg-nego-03> )

Shumon.

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