Re: Last Call: MIME-based Secure EDI to Proposed Standard
"Paul V Ford-Hutchinson" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ediint |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Please remember, on this point, I am not saying AS-1 is bad; I am saying that the document title should reflect the narrowed scope of applicability. Dave Crocker wrote: >At 07:32 AM 11/24/2001 -0800, Ricardo Johnson wrote: >>If we wish to reduce the cost of VANs and expand the use of EDI then we >>must substitute, not eliminate, the important functions that VANs provide: >>confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation of origin and receipt, >>archival, time stamping, tracking, and others. > >Users of EDI are not a monolithic set. I think that's what I was trying to say. >Some require the third-party services of a VAN. And these users are excluded by design from the EDI-INT proposals. >Others do not. Some require very high degrees of >accountability, sufficient for dispute resolution in a court of >law. Others do not. But they are all doing EDI. My problem is that the EDI-INT group has reduced the applicability of its' solution to such a degree that it cannot claim to be "How to do EDI over the Internet". As a corollary, if I were trying to deploy protocols to 'do' EDI over the Internet in my environment (using 3rd party VAN services - by far the largest slice of the EDI pie today), AS-1 would not be a useful starting point. > >>My observations may be too late to change anything. However, I agree with >>you: At least the title of the document should be adjusted to >>"peer-to-peer EDI" in order to reflect the limitations of the current AS1 >>proposal. > >In fact the EDI-INT specification does not force communications to be >peer-to-peer. It may be, but it may not be. Oh, dear - my fault - I replaced one implicit meaning-laden term (EDI) with another (Peer-Peer). In my defence, I would claim that this is the fault of EDI, by putting routing information at the application layer. To my mind "Peer-Peer EDI" can only possibly mean "Peer application to Peer application", the ins and outs of the journey of the packets of bits are inconsequential. Any suggestions for a better term ? >In a strict sense, the fact that it will tend to be email-based guarantees >that it is not strictly peer-to-peer, since virtually all email is mediated >by email relays. It would not be difficult for one or more of those relays >to also serve as an EDI VAN. It would be impossible for those relays to serve as an EDI VAN. They could be an SMTP VAN; let's not get into a "what's the difference between EDI and email" debate please. >Your concern is that last-hop routing cannot be based on the EDI contents, >unless the contents are first decrypted. Your technical assessment is >correct, but does not represent a problem with the current specification. I'm interested in what is 'last-hop' about EDI routing ? Surely the point of defining routing information is for it to be available throughout the journey of the message. If you encrypt it between the application end-points - it has gone. >The issue of last-hop routing was discussed at the earliest IETF EDI >meetings -- the EDI working group that preceded the current one -- and >there was clear consensus to leave that issue outside of the scope the IETF >effort. Routing based on email address is sufficient. Nobody is arguing that AS-1 does not solve the problem as specified. What I am arguing is that the problem that you are solving is not general EDI over the Internet, but has had its' scope reduced to such a degree as to be inapplicable to the way EDI is done today by the vast majority of EDI users. >If the sender wishes differential routing, they merely need to send to >different email addresses. Agreed one _can_ layer all sorts of conventions and OOB mechanisms onto this spec to make it generally useful. But I thought the whole point of a protocol spec was to define the conventions, not skirt around them. >If the receiving wishes differential routing, >they must first decrypt the contents. That decryption takes place within >the security perimeter of the receiving organization. Hence this >requirement is entirely reasonable. Fine, but that assumes the receiver is the EDI Peer to the sender and not an application/transport layer third party. An acceptable assumption, but not one that is true for traditional, VAN based, EDI. Paul -- Paul Ford-Hutchinson : eCommerce application security : [email protected] MPT-6, IBM , PO Box 31, Birmingham Rd, Warwick, CV34 5JL +44 (0)1926 462005 http://www.ford-hutchinson.com/~fh-1-pfh/ftps-ext.html