Re: Segmentation within HIP
Miika Komu <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.hipsec,gmane.ietf.hip |
|---|---|
| Organization | Ericsson AB |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Samu, On 03/26/2016 03:16 AM, Tom Henderson wrote: > > > On 03/25/2016 03:49 PM, Derek Fawcus wrote: >> Recently I've been working on middlebox s/w: Firewalls and NAT. >> >> One thing this has brought home to me is just how unreliable >> fragmentation is on the current Internet. NAT will often simply >> break it (such that they can not be reassembled) or just discard >> them, and firewalls are often set up to block them. >> >> As such, almost every protocol now would seem to need protocol >> level segmentation/fragmentation, rather than depend up IP level >> fragmentation. >> >> It struck me that it should be quite simple to extend HIP to >> support such. >> >> 1) Add a Controls bit which advertises that the sender supports >> segmentation. 2) Define a new parameter, numbered 1 such that it >> is first in the parameters, and is critical. Within the parameter >> have a seqno/identifier, offset and more segments / final segment >> bit, possibly also a total size field. Define some simple >> reassembly rules, similar to those for IP fragments, such that one >> could reassemble a HIP packet larger than 2008 bytes if desired >> (how big?). 3) Possibly also define a none critical parameter >> within the non signed, non MACed range which advertises the max >> size packet the sender is willing to reassemble. In fact I guess >> this might remove the need to use a Controls bit, since it would >> imply the sender can reassemble. >> >> Then have a rule that once one party has seen the other party >> advertise the segmentation capability within the current BEX >> session, it is free to make use of segmentation towards that peer. >> >> Thoughts? >> >> DF > > Hi Derek, I don't remember the details, but in the early days of HIP, > it was decided to avoid the burden of supporting fragmentation. I > guess I'd prefer to see some evidence that HIP messages are being > fragmented in the wild before starting a work effort to add support. do you recall how long a typical X.509 certificate can get? _______________________________________________ Hipsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/hipsec
smime.p7s
(application/pkcs7-signature, 4 KB) - not displayed