non-repudiation of message origin
[email protected] Mon, 29 Jul 2002 11:23:58 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.idwg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <397E0659AA2DD411843500508B64F1CE04310311@USBOSMX01> |
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Just as an FYI, here is the text from Section 5 of the current
draft-ietf-idwg-beep-idxp-05:
The [protocol] SHOULD be able to ensure non-repudiation of the
origin
of IDMEF messages.
IDXP supports non-repudiation of session origin through the use
of
an appropriate underlying BEEP security profile. An IDXP peer
application MAY use IDMEF content and/or BEEP session
credentials
to provide for non-repudiation of message origin. The TLS
profile
is an example of a security profile that offers non-repudiation
of
session origin through the authentication of public-key
certificates. TLS MUST be offered as a mechanism to provide
non-
repudiation of session origin, and TLS SHOULD be used to
provide
non-repudiation of session origin.
Cheers,
Ben
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