Re: AD review of draft-ietf-imapapnd-appendlimit-extension-06
"Adrien de Croy" <[email protected]> Thu, 17 Dec 2015 23:16:28 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.imapext |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <embf04f92a-8a6e-4a94-9836-1fe2719968bc@bodybag> |
Just to be clear, you're talking about an attack on APPEND from an authenticated user? I think these sorts of attacks have different sorts of solutions, like blocking the account. ------ Original Message ------ From: "Jayantheesh S B" <[email protected]> To: "Barry Leiba" <[email protected]> Cc: "Alexey Melnikov" <[email protected]>; "Narendra Bisht" <[email protected]>; "S Moonesamy ([email protected])" <[email protected]>; "S Moonesamy ([email protected])" <[email protected]>; "[email protected]" <[email protected]> Sent: 18/12/2015 11:57:27 a.m. Subject: Re: [imapext] AD review of draft-ietf-imapapnd-appendlimit-extension-06 >Hi Barry, > >Thanks for the quick review comments. > >For Section 6, this was our reasoning behind the text > >Say a server has a limit of 50 MB. Before this extension, an attacker >first tries to APPEND 25 MB and it succeeds. >Then he tries 40MB and that too succeeds. Finally he tries 60 MB to >find the limit of >server and use that as start of attack. With this extension the >attacker can find the limit in no time, making it easy for him to >attack. > >Regards, >Jay >-----Original Message----- >From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of >Barry Leiba >Sent: Thursday, December 17, 2015 5:03 PM >To: Jayantheesh S B >Cc: Narendra Bisht; Alexey Melnikov; [email protected]; S Moonesamy >([email protected]); S Moonesamy ([email protected]) >Subject: Re: [imapext] AD review of >draft-ietf-imapapnd-appendlimit-extension-06 > >> Please find the latest version of the draft (version 07) attached. As >> per the review discussion, we have updated the draft. >... >> We will upload the draft once if all the review comments has been >>addressed. > >This looks mostly good, and thanks very much for all the work on this. >The ABNF and the Security Considerations still need a bit (see below). >Some editorial nits to fix, as well, before it's ready to post. >Below, "OLD" refers to text in the proposed -07 version. Except for >the ABNF and Security considerations, these are all very minor >editorial things. > >In the abstract, make it "APPEND commands" (plural). > >In the Introduction: > >OLD > Several IMAP servers have limitation for mail upload size which is > not published to the email client. When email client APPEND a mail > with huge attachments, using non-synchronizing literals it fails due > to size restriction set by the IMAP server. >NEW > Some IMAP servers have limits for mail upload size, and those limits > are not published to the email client. When the email client >APPENDs > a message with huge attachments, using non-synchronizing literals, > the APPEND fails because of the upload limit, but the client has > already sent the message data anyway. >END > >In Section 3: > >OLD > IMAP server can have mailbox specific APPENDLIMIT value, which will > not be advertised as part of CAPABILITY response. The IMAP server > can publish NIL for a mailbox to convey that there is no APPENDLIMIT > to that mailbox [RFC4466]. >NEW > An IMAP server can have mailbox-specific APPENDLIMIT values, which > will not be advertised as part of CAPABILITY response. The IMAP > server can publish specific values for each mailbox, and can publish > "NIL" for a mailbox to convey that there is no APPENDLIMIT for that > mailbox. >END > >(I don't think there's any need for a citation to 4466 here; we'll have >it below, by the ABNF.) > >In the section titles of 3.1 and 3.2, make it "STATUS response to the" >(not "in the"). This was my error when I suggested the change; sorry. > >Similarly, in Section 3.2 take out the word "emit", which was there in >error. > >In Section 5, I think you misunderstood Alexey's suggestion for using >the 4466 changes. Let's try this; Alexey, please check that I got this >right: > >Replace all the ABNF in Section 5 with this: > >NEW > capability /= "APPENDLIMIT" ["=" number] > ;; capability is defined in RFC 3501 > > status-att /= "APPENDLIMIT" > ;; status-att is defined in RFC 3501 > > status-att-val /= "APPENDLIMIT" SP (number / nil) > ;; status-att-val is defined in RFC 4466 END > >...and also make this change: > >OLD > [RFC3501] defines the non-terminals > "capability", "resp-text-code" and "status-att". >NEW > [RFC3501] defines the non-terminals > "capability" and "status-att", and [RFC4466] defines > "status-att-val". >END > >Reasoning: >First, I think the extra level of indirection, making two lines per >item, was only confusing. > >Second, there seem to be three things you need to do: (1) add the >capability string, (2) add the APPENDLIMIT status option, and (3) add >the APPENDLIMIT status response. Those three items do it. I don't >know why you had the addition to resp-text-code -- it was always the >wrong thing to have, and we missed it before. > >In the paragraph after the ABNF, change "A number indicating the fixed >maximum" to "The number indicates the fixed maximum". > >In Section 6, my comment about the security considerations still needs >to be addressed. You say this: > > The IMAP APPENDLIMIT extension described in this document can > conceivably be used to facilitate Denial-of-Service attacks. > Specifically, the information contained in the APPENDLIMIT >capability > and use of the APPEND command make it somewhat quicker and easier to > devise an efficacious Denial-of-Service attack. However, unless > implementations are very weak, these extensions do not create any > vulnerability that has not always existed with IMAP. > >I still ask: Why does this information make it quicker and easier to do >a DoS attack? I don't see it, and the document needs to explain it >clearly. I can always, with or without this option, try to append a >very large message using a non-synchronizing literal for the message >data. What is it about this extension that makes it quicker, easier, >or more effective (I'd avoid the more obscure word "efficacious")? > >Barry >_______________________________________________ >imapext mailing list >[email protected] >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/imapext _______________________________________________ imapext mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/imapext