Re: Add "oauth-authorization-resource" attribute?

Michael Sweet via ipp <[email protected]>
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.ipp
Message-ID <[email protected]>
Smith,

WRT the resource parameter for Token Exchange, it is the resource URL being accessed, i.e. "printer-uri".  Without token exchange, we don't pass resources in an authorization request.


> On Nov 30, 2022, at 10:56 AM, Kennedy, Smith (Wireless & IPP Standards) <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Hi Mike,
> 
>> On Nov 9, 2022, at 7:39 AM, Michael Sweet <[email protected]> wrote:
>> 
>> CAUTION: External Email
>> 
>> From: Michael Sweet <[email protected]>
>> Subject: Re: [IPP] Add "oauth-authorization-resource" attribute?
>> Date: November 9, 2022 at 7:39:14 AM MST
>> To: "Kennedy, Smith (Wireless & IPP Standards)" <[email protected]>
>> Cc: PWG IPP Workgroup <[email protected]>
>> 
>> 
>> Smith,
>> 
>>> On Nov 8, 2022, at 11:56 PM, Kennedy, Smith (Wireless & IPP Standards) <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> ...
>>> If an Authentication Service supports a certificate or some other more trustable artifact as a resource identifier, perhaps one provisioned to the printer at the time the printer is registered, that could improve the situation, right? I thought we discussed that at the August F2F.
>> 
>> Yes, for authenticating the System/Printer/Proxy to the auth server - that's one of the things MS does for their Universal Print Service.
>> 
>> The point of the Client passing the printer-uri/system-uri when doing token exchange is to limit the potential exposure of credentials.  The Client will have already validated the Printer's X.509 certificate when it connects to do a Get-Printer-Attributes, and then the authorization server can validate that the System/Printer/Proxy has registered *that* printer-uri/system-uri.  That combined with the Client validating the oauth-authorization-server-uri value will minimize the likelihood of a breach.
>> 
>>> Regardless, I think that it would be better for the client to use the value provided by a purpose-defined but abstract attribute like "oauth-authorization-resource-id" instead of instructing or guiding clients to use "printer-uuid" or "printer-uri". The value held by "oauth-authorization-resource-id" could be a URI or a UUID (printer-uuid or some other UUID).
>> 
>> There is no way to validate the value, so its use in securing the authorization token would be lost.
>> 
>> With the URI, the Client resolves the address, connects to the service, negotiates a secure connection via TLS, and is able to validate the server-side X.509 certificate against a trusted root CA (no self-signed certs if you are using OAuth!)
> 
> Agree, but I don't think that eliminates the value that "oauth-authorization-resource-id" provides. The value held by "oauth-authorization-resource-id" could be whatever is needed to identify the resource to the Authentication Service. In some cases it may be "printer-uuid" or "printer-uri" or some unique value provisioned to the Printer by the Authentication Service during printer registration. Defining "oauth-authorization-resource-id" means we don't have to provide specific guidance as to what is provided in the OAuth 2.0 requests that require a resource ID to be specified as a parameter.
> 
> The Client is still free to compare the elements of "printer-uri" with the fields in the Printer's X.509 TLS certificate.


________________________
Michael Sweet

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