Re: DRAFT Montreal minutes
Nicolas Williams <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ips |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
On Wed, Jul 12, 2006 at 07:51:58PM -0400, [email protected] wrote: > iSCSI Security Mechanisms: WG Members - time remaining (if any) > > The IETF Security Area has requested that IETF Working Groups plan > to transition away from usage of MD5. iSCSI CHAP currently uses > MD5 in a fashion not directly threatened by the hash collision > results known for MD5. If time is available in the meeting, it > will be used to discuss what to do instead, as using a different > hash with CHAP is not the only option. > > Above description is copied verbatim from Dallas agenda. There > are two other related concerns: > a) The Kerberos support in iSCSI is frowned upon by Kerberos > experts. iSCSI Kerberos is not GSSAPI-based, and hence > can't be used with GSSAPI-only Kerberos implementations. (a) is no longer an issue for me... > b) The SPKM-1 and SPKM-2 methods are arguably obsolete. Yes, but also it made no sense to specify their use without specifying the use of the GSS-API. > SASL is a potential means of addressing all of these problems: > - SASL has and/or will have methods based on SHA-256, the > next hash of choice (according to the IETF Security Area) > - SASL has GSSAPI-based Kerberos support that has been > designed by Kerberos experts > - SASL has an SPKM-3 method. SASL has no SPKM-3 mechanism. The GSS-API does (see below). SPKM-3 is being revised by individual submitters; it's currently undergoing expert review. SASL's GSS-API bridge currently only really works with the Kerberos V mechanism. There's a new SASL GSS-API bridge in the works that will be much more general and which introduces a SASL-specific channel binding concept. > The approach would be to add SASL methods to iSCSI by doing > mapping the SASL tokens into iSCSI and providing authentication > mechanism names (e.g., the SASL mechanism <foo> is negotiated > by iSCSI as the SASL-<foo> mechanism). These would be additions > - the current must-implement CHAP mechanism is not broken, and > would not be removed. Sure. > There may be a draft forthcoming that will add SASL to iSCSI - > the sense of the room is that this would be a good thing to > do, although it is not of immediate urgency. I agree. Longer term, when the BTNS WG completes work on "connection latching" (how to construct "IPsec channels") and IPsec APIs then iSCSI should be able to specify a profile of iSCSI using SASL channel binding to IPsec channels and simplify IPsec configuration. Nico -- _______________________________________________ Ips mailing list [email protected] https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ips