Re: Labeled IPsec options

On Wed, 25 Dec 2019, Valery Smyslov wrote:

> Another approach - use some new status notification containing
> seclabel that the initiator would include in any request to create
> Child SA. This is easy to implement, but there is a possibility,
> that unsupporting responder will just ignore this notification
> and create SA w/o proposed seclabel. In this case the initiator
> would need to immediately delete this SA.

That is a big problem but not the only one.

> My proposal only deals with this situation. If initiator and responder
> exchange SECLABELS_SUPPORTED notifications at the time of
> creating IKE SA (in IKE_SA_INIT), then the initiator will know,

During IKE_SA_INIT you do not fully know which configuration you are
talking to, as no ID's have been exchanged. If a server has some
connections with and some without security labels, it cannot guarantee
success despite the notification. And that is assuming the notification
does not indicate "support" but indicates "supported and required"

> Again, I'm fine with either using new Traffic Selectors or Notify
> for this purpose. Both have pros and contras.

I think the majority seems to be in favour of Traffic Selectors. While
a combinatory explosion is a worry, we do not expect that many new types
of traffic selectors, so it is unlikely to become a big problem I think.

Paul