[Pqc] Re: [EXTERNAL] [IPsec] PQC integration in IPse c/IKEv2 - implementation experience and interop
Nick Grifka <[email protected]> Mon, 22 Jun 2026 22:18:06 +0000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.pqc,gmane.ietf.ipsec |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CH4PR00MB2224DB61CDA667347F9663DCBAEF2@CH4PR00MB2224.namprd00.prod.outlook.com> |
--===============1400545651785336048==
Content-Language: en-US
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="_000_CH4PR00MB2224DB61CDA667347F9663DCBAEF2CH4PR00MB2224namp_"
--_000_CH4PR00MB2224DB61CDA667347F9663DCBAEF2CH4PR00MB2224namp_
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi Songbo,
I agree, there are many aspects to this. I see a few categories here, all o=
f which would be relevant to interop discussions:
1.
Test deployments (ex: site-to-site VPN)
2.
PQC-related mechanisms (ex: multiple key exchange via RFC 9370)
3.
PQC-related mechanism details (ex: within RFC 9370, multiple key exchange f=
or IKE SA rekey)
4.
PQC algorithm sets (ex: ML-KEM-1024 key exchange method)
5.
Network topologies (ex: initiator behind a NAT)
A single matrix capturing all combinations of these aspects might be hard t=
o represent. To simplify, I've listified the categories I think are most re=
levant for initial discussions and left out the rest on purpose to start. I=
'm certain it is incomplete, but it can easily be edited and expanded. CNSA=
2.0 profile applicability can also be layered on top.
1. Test Deployment
* Site-to-site VPN
* Point-to-site VPN
* Point-to-point IPsec
2. Ipsec mode
* Tunnel mode
* Transport mode
3. PQC-related mechanism
* Mixing Preshared Keys (RFC 8784)
* Mixing Preshared Keys using Intermediate (RFC 9867)
* Multiple Key Exchange (RFC 9370)
*
Signature Authentication using PQC (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth)
* Reliable IKEv2 Transport (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transp=
ort)
* Downgrade Prevention (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-preventio=
n)
4. PQC algorithm set
* ML-KEM-512
* ML-KEM-768
* ML-KEM-1024
* ML-DSA-44
* ML-DSA-65
* ML-DSA-87
Also, I see in the past there have been PQC-related interop events (ex: htt=
ps://github.com/IETF-Hackathon/pqc-certificates). Is there any appetite for=
an interop event for PQC in IPsec/IKEv2 amongst the community? I realize t=
he nature of many IPsec/IKEv2 products might not be suitable for a robust a=
nd efficient interop framework (ex: https://github.com/quic-interop), so ma=
ybe that makes such an event less practical.
-Nick
________________________________
From: Blue Dog <[email protected]>
Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2026 9:11 PM
To: [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <[email protected]>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [Pqc] [IPsec] PQC integration in IPsec/IKEv2 - implemen=
tation experience and interop
You don't often get email from [email protected]. Learn why this is impo=
rtant<https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification>
Hello Matt,
I do not have implementation results to report, but from a deployment and i=
nteroperability perspective I think it would be useful to separate the disc=
ussion into a few test dimensions.
The CNSA 2.0 IPsec profile is a useful reference point, but it is a profile=
and not a complete interop plan. For implementation alignment, I would sug=
gest tracking at least the following items explicitly:
* which transition mechanism is being tested, for example PPK-based dep=
loyment, additional key exchange / IKE_INTERMEDIATE behavior, or a profile-=
specific combination of mechanisms;
* whether the test is site-to-site or remote-access VPN, since certific=
ate handling, authentication policy, and path behavior can differ materiall=
y;
* IKE message size behavior, including fragmentation, retransmission be=
havior, and whether reliable IKE transport is being considered for larger e=
xchanges;
* downgrade and fallback policy when one peer supports only classical a=
lgorithms or only part of the PQC profile;
* rekey and CREATE_CHILD_SA behavior, not only the initial IKE_SA_INIT =
and IKE_AUTH path;
* logging and diagnostics for negotiation failure, because several fail=
ure cases can otherwise look like generic tunnel-establishment problems;
* certificate-chain and authentication-payload size, especially if ML-D=
SA certificates or CNSA-aligned PKI profiles are in scope.
For interop, it may help to publish a small matrix that separates required =
profile conformance from optional transition mechanisms. That would let imp=
lementers state, for example, whether they support a specific CNSA profile =
mode, PPK, additional key exchange, reliable transport, or only a subset of=
those items.
I would be interested in helping review an interoperability checklist or te=
st matrix if one is assembled on-list. That kind of artifact would also mak=
e it easier for implementers who are not ready to expose code or product de=
tails to contribute useful compatibility information.
Best regards,
Songbo Bu
On Fri, 15 May 2026 19:06:12 +0000, Matt Ige Matthew.Ige=3D40microsoft.com@=
dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:[email protected]> wrote:
Hi,
I=E2=80=99m reaching out to understand how others are approaching the integ=
ration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into their IPsec/IKEv2 implementa=
tions.
We are currently looking at the CNSA 2.0 IPsec profile draft as a reference=
: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile
I have a couple of specific questions:
1. Beyond what is outlined in this draft, are there additional requireme=
nts, design considerations, or extensions that implementations are incorpor=
ating in practice?
2. Are there organizations actively implementing PQC for IPsec that woul=
d be interested in interoperability testing or collaboration?
We are actively working on our implementation and are particularly interest=
ed in ensuring alignment with emerging standards and ecosystem compatibilit=
y. I appreciate any insights or pointers.
Thanks,
Matt
--_000_CH4PR00MB2224DB61CDA667347F9663DCBAEF2CH4PR00MB2224namp_
Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=3DWindows-1=
252">
<style type=3D"text/css" style=3D"display:none;"> P {margin-top:0;margin-bo=
ttom:0;} </style>
</head>
<body dir=3D"ltr">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Aptos, =
Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Hi Songbo,</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Aptos, =
Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Aptos, =
Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontService, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; fo=
nt-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
I agree, there are many aspects to this. I see a few categories here, all o=
f which would be relevant to interop discussions:</div>
<ol start=3D"1" data-editing-info=3D"{"applyListStyleFromLevel":f=
alse,"orderedStyleType":3}" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: =
0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontService, C=
alibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin=
-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; list-style-type: "1) ";">
<div role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr;">Test deployments (ex: =
site-to-site VPN)</div>
</li><li style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontServi=
ce, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); m=
argin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; list-style-type: "2) ";">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr=
;">PQC-related mechanisms (ex: multiple key exchange via RFC 9370)</div>
</li><li style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontServi=
ce, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); m=
argin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; list-style-type: "3) ";">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr=
;">PQC-related mechanism details (ex: within RFC 9370, multiple key ex=
change for IKE SA rekey)</div>
</li><li style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontServi=
ce, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); m=
argin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; list-style-type: "4) ";">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr=
;">PQC algorithm sets (ex: ML-KEM-1024 key exchange method)</div>
</li><li style=3D"font-family: Aptos, Aptos_EmbeddedFont, Aptos_MSFontServi=
ce, Calibri, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); m=
argin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; list-style-type: "5) ";">
<div role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr;">Network topologies (ex=
: initiator behind a NAT)</div>
</li></ol>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr;"><a name=3D"x__MailO=
riginal"></a></div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
A single matrix capturing all combinations of these aspects might be hard t=
o represent. To simplify, I've listified the categories I think are most re=
levant for initial discussions and left out the rest on purpose to start. I=
'm certain it is incomplete, but
it can easily be edited and expanded. CNSA 2.0 profile applicability can a=
lso be layered on top.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 0in; margin-bottom: 0i=
n; list-style-type: decimal;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Test Deployment</li><ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 0i=
n; margin-bottom: 0in; list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Site-to-site VPN</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, s=
ans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bo=
ttom: 0px;">
Point-to-site VPN</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, =
sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-b=
ottom: 0px;">
Point-to-point IPsec</li></ol>
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Ipsec mode</li><ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 0in; ma=
rgin-bottom: 0in; list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Tunnel mode</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-s=
erif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:=
0px;">
Transport mode</li></ol>
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
PQC-related mechanism</li><ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-t=
op: 0in; margin-bottom: 0in; list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Mixing Preshared Keys (RFC 8784)</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Ari=
al, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top=
: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Mixing Preshared Keys using Intermediate (RFC 9867)</li><li style=3D"font-f=
amily: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0=
, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Multiple Key Exchange (RFC 9370)</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Ari=
al, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top=
: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation">Signature Authenticatio=
n using PQC (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-pqc-auth)</div>
</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-=
size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Reliable IKEv2 Transport (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-reliable-transport)</li>=
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
Downgrade Prevention (draft-ietf-ipsecme-ikev2-downgrade-prevention)</li></=
ol>
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
PQC algorithm set</li><ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: =
0in; margin-bottom: 0in; list-style-type: lower-alpha;">
<li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size:=
12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;">
ML-KEM-512</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-se=
rif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: =
0px;">
ML-KEM-768</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-se=
rif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: =
0px;">
ML-KEM-1024</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-s=
erif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom:=
0px;">
ML-DSA-44</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-ser=
if; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0=
px;">
ML-DSA-65</li><li style=3D"font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-ser=
if; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0=
px;">
ML-DSA-87</li></ol>
</ol>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
Also, I see in the past there have been PQC-related interop events (ex: <a =
href=3D"https://github.com/IETF-Hackathon/pqc-certificates">
https://github.com/IETF-Hackathon/pqc-certificates</a>). Is there any appet=
ite for an interop event for PQC in IPsec/IKEv2 amongst the community? I re=
alize the nature of many IPsec/IKEv2 products might not be suitable for a r=
obust and efficient interop framework
(ex: <a href=3D"https://github.com/quic-interop">https://github.com/quic-i=
nterop</a>), so maybe that makes such an event less practical.</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
-Nick</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<hr style=3D"direction: ltr; display: inline-block; width: 98%;">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<b>From:</b> Blue Dog <[email protected]><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Saturday, May 23, 2026 9:11 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> [email protected] <[email protected]>; [email protected] <pqc=
@ietf.org><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] [Pqc] [IPsec] PQC integration in IPsec/IKEv=
2 - implementation experience and interop</div>
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; font-family: Calibri=
, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">
<br>
</div>
<table cellspacing=3D"0" cellpadding=3D"0" border=3D"0" style=3D"direction:=
ltr; text-indent: revert; line-height: revert; white-space: revert; backgr=
ound-color: revert; display: table; margin: revert; width: 100%; height: re=
vert; table-layout: fixed; color: revert;" class=3D"elementToProof">
<tbody>
<tr style=3D"background-color: revert;">
<td style=3D"direction: ltr; text-indent: revert; line-height: revert; whit=
e-space: revert; border-color: revert; background-color: rgb(166, 166, 166)=
; padding: 7px 2px; word-break: revert; color: revert; width: 0px; height: =
revert;">
</td>
<td style=3D"direction: ltr; text-align: left; text-indent: revert; line-he=
ight: revert; white-space: revert; border-width: revert; border-style: reve=
rt; border-color: revert; background-color: rgb(234, 234, 234); padding: 7p=
x 5px 7px 15px; word-break: revert; color: rgb(33, 33, 33); width: 100%; he=
ight: revert;">
<div class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; text-align: left; te=
xt-indent: revert; line-height: revert; white-space: revert; font-family: w=
f_segoe-ui_normal, "Segoe UI", "Segoe WP", Tahoma, Aria=
l, sans-serif; color: revert;">
<span style=3D"letter-spacing: revert; background-color: revert; line-heigh=
t: revert;">You don't often get email from [email protected].
<a href=3D"https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification" id=3D"OWAa1f447e8=
-238c-3e67-f84f-7605095149e4" class=3D"x_OWAAutoLink" data-auth=3D"NotAppli=
cable" style=3D"color: revert; display: revert; background-color: revert;">
Learn why this is important</a></span></div>
</td>
<td style=3D"direction: ltr; text-align: left; text-indent: revert; line-he=
ight: revert; white-space: revert; border-color: revert; background-color: =
rgb(234, 234, 234); padding: 7px 5px; word-break: revert; color: rgb(33, 33=
, 33); width: 75px; height: revert;">
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Hello Matt,</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
I do not have implementation results to report, but from a deployment and i=
nteroperability perspective I think it would be useful to separate the disc=
ussion into a few test dimensions.</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
The CNSA 2.0 IPsec profile is a useful reference point, but it is a profile=
and not a complete interop plan. For implementation alignment, I would sug=
gest tracking at least the following items explicitly:</p>
<ul style=3D"direction: ltr;">
<li style=3D"direction: ltr;">which transition mechanism is being tested, f=
or example PPK-based deployment, additional key exchange / IKE_INTERMEDIATE=
behavior, or a profile-specific combination of mechanisms;</li><li style=
=3D"direction: ltr;">whether the test is site-to-site or remote-access VPN,=
since certificate handling, authentication policy, and path behavior can d=
iffer materially;</li><li style=3D"direction: ltr;">IKE message size behavi=
or, including fragmentation, retransmission behavior, and whether reliable =
IKE transport is being considered for larger exchanges;</li><li style=3D"di=
rection: ltr;">downgrade and fallback policy when one peer supports only cl=
assical algorithms or only part of the PQC profile;</li><li style=3D"direct=
ion: ltr;">rekey and CREATE_CHILD_SA behavior, not only the initial IKE_SA_=
INIT and IKE_AUTH path;</li><li style=3D"direction: ltr;">logging and diagn=
ostics for negotiation failure, because several failure cases can otherwise=
look like generic tunnel-establishment problems;</li><li style=3D"directio=
n: ltr;">certificate-chain and authentication-payload size, especially if M=
L-DSA certificates or CNSA-aligned PKI profiles are in scope.</li></ul>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
For interop, it may help to publish a small matrix that separates required =
profile conformance from optional transition mechanisms. That would let imp=
lementers state, for example, whether they support a specific CNSA profile =
mode, PPK, additional key exchange,
reliable transport, or only a subset of those items.</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
I would be interested in helping review an interoperability checklist or te=
st matrix if one is assembled on-list. That kind of artifact would also mak=
e it easier for implementers who are not ready to expose code or product de=
tails to contribute useful compatibility
information.</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Best regards,</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Songbo Bu</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
On Fri, 15 May 2026 19:06:12 +0000, Matt Ige <a href=3D"mailto:Matthew.Ige=
[email protected]" id=3D"OWA06ff3cae-c430-fd6e-b2c0-2e07703=
008b6" class=3D"x_OWAAutoLink" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px=
;">
[email protected]</a> wrote:</p>
<blockquote class=3D"elementToProof">
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Hi,</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
I=E2=80=99m reaching out to understand how others are approaching the integ=
ration of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) into their IPsec/IKEv2 implementa=
tions.</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
We are currently looking at the CNSA 2.0 IPsec profile draft as a reference=
: <a href=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-pro=
file" id=3D"OWA60eb10c5-75ea-adf0-9b43-01b7c65b2a38" class=3D"x_OWAAutoLink=
" originalsrc=3D"https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec=
-profile" data-auth=3D"NotApplicable" style=3D"margin-top: 0px; margin-bott=
om: 0px;">
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-guthrie-cnsa2-ipsec-profile</a></p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
I have a couple of specific questions:</p>
<ol start=3D"1" style=3D"direction: ltr;">
<li>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr; =
margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;">
Beyond what is outlined in this draft, are there additional requirements, d=
esign considerations, or extensions that implementations are incorporating =
in practice?</p>
</li><li>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" role=3D"presentation" style=3D"direction: ltr; =
margin-top: 1em; margin-bottom: 1em;">
Are there organizations actively implementing PQC for IPsec that would be i=
nterested in interoperability testing or collaboration?</p>
</li></ol>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
We are actively working on our implementation and are particularly interest=
ed in ensuring alignment with emerging standards and ecosystem compatibilit=
y. I appreciate any insights or pointers.</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Thanks,</p>
<p class=3D"elementToProof" style=3D"direction: ltr; margin-top: 1em; margi=
n-bottom: 1em;">
Matt</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</html>
--_000_CH4PR00MB2224DB61CDA667347F9663DCBAEF2CH4PR00MB2224namp_--
--===============1400545651785336048==
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: inline
LS0gClBxYyBtYWlsaW5nIGxpc3QgLS0gcHFjQGlldGYub3JnClRvIHVuc3Vic2NyaWJlIHNlbmQg
YW4gZW1haWwgdG8gcHFjLWxlYXZlQGlldGYub3JnCg==
--===============1400545651785336048==--