Re: comments on draft-ietf-itrace-03

Mikael Olsson <[email protected]> Mon, 10 Feb 2003 00:09:12 +0100
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.itrace
Organization Clavister AB
Message-ID <[email protected]>
This is basically a "me too" post, but given the utter lack
of responses, I guess any response is better than none.

Pekka Savola wrote:
> 
>    2.5 Traced packet (TAG=0x09)
> 
>       This element provides the contents of the traced packet, as much as
>       can reasonably fit, subject to link and router resource constraints.
>       This element MUST be present at the top level within the TRACEBACK
>       message, and MUST contain at least the IP header and the first 64
>       bits of the body of the traced packet.
> 
> ==> [send more]

Agree. I think the spec should say "include as much as possible
up to the max ICMP data length".


>    2.8 Authentication data
> 
> ==> this section does not seem to take a stance whether this
> MAY/SHOULD/... be included.
> 
>            * timestamp of the time at which the hash was taken, NTP
>               format (eight octets)
> 
> ==> [why _two_ timestamps?]

I was wondering about this, too.  Would someone care to shed some 
light on the design decision here?


>      The public-key information element can be used to discover the
>       appropriate public keys, and other related information.
>       This element contains a URL, pointing to an XML page that contains
>       the public key used to sign key-disclosure elements.
> 
> ==> is this kind of XML referral commonplace in security architectures?
> I've never come across that myself..

I also fail to see the point of adding XML to the mix.
Why not just state that the URL should point to an X.509 cert?

Plain X.509 certs _are_ after all a proposed internet standard
(RFC 2459/3280), and there are (proposed) standardized ways of
obtaining X.509 certs via HTTP, FTP and LDAP; see RFC 2585 
(HTTP+FTP) and RFC 2587 (LDAP).  They do not include XML.

Is there an additional reason for using XML that I am 
not aware of?

Oh, wait, here's an interesting point: certs have "acceptable
use" parameters, e.g. "may be used for email", "may be used
for web servers".  I believe (but am not certain) that these
fields are easily extended.  Should we register a "may be
used for itrace" acceptable use field?
(Any PKI wizards around that can comment on this?)


> ==> I've always seen [TLV] spelled out Type-Length-Value, but I guess 
> [tag-length-value] is ok too..

Same here. Or even "Type-Length-Value tags".


-- 
Mikael Olsson, Clavister AB
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