#25 [**] prf (section 8)

"KAMADA Ken'ichi" <[email protected]> Thu, 10 Feb 2005 16:14:43 +0900
Newsgroups gmane.ietf.kink
Message-ID <20050210161443XN%[email protected]>
At Fri, 28 Jan 2005 21:19:39 -0500 (EST),
Sam Hartman <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Section 6.1:
> 
>    o    IKE Quick Mode (phase 2) uses the hash algorithm used in main
>         mode (phase 1) to generate the keying material. KINK MUST use
>         the hashing algorithm specified in the session ticket's etype.
> 
> [**] This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
> appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
> depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
> replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
> when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
> centered around key determination in pkinit.

IKE requires the very PRF to generate IPsec keys, so using PRFs
provided by kcrypto is appropriate here.
kcrypto also says "The PRF output string should be suitable for use
in key generation,..."

Does anyone object to using the kcrypto PRF?

-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <[email protected]>