Re: I-D Action: draft-ietf-krb-wg-des-die-die-die-02.txt

Tom Yu <[email protected]> writes:

> Simon Josefsson <[email protected]> writes:
>
>> Any references to this vetting?  Even RFC 4757 published 6 years ago
>> appears to me to say that the cipher SHOULD NOT be used for high-volume
>> connections, citing RC4 vulnerabilities as a reason.  To me, this new
>> document implies RC4-HMAC is stronger than we thought it was before,
>> which seems surprising.
>
> I think RC4-HMAC is not stronger than we thought it was, and we should
> make sure this document doesn't make it seem that we are saying that.
> Perhaps if we say anything about RC4-HMAC, we should reiterate that
> the security considerations of RFC 4757 continue to apply, with the
> exception that RC4-HMAC-EXP is no longer considered secure.

That seems like a good idea.

>> The document title currently is "Deprecate DES support for Kerberos", so
>> yes, I suggest to remove the deprecation of RC4 from the document.
>
> If your concern is with the accuracy of the title, note that in this
> document, we already say an implementation SHOULD NOT implement some
> algorithms that do not involve DES -- CRC32 and RSA-MD4 among them.

How about a title of "Deprecate historical algorithms in Kerberos" or
something similar instead?  Even though the document has contained
references to RC4 before, I did not fully realize that before this
discussion, because the title has caused me to treat this as
DES-deprecation only.

/Simon
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