Re: des-die-die-die and RC4
Tom Yu <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.krb-wg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Simon Josefsson <[email protected]> writes: > Saying that "implementations SHOULD NOT implement" makes it easy to test > whether a particular implementation has code for a particular algorithm > or not. Saying "implementaters SHOULD NOT provide" appears weaker to > me. I read "provide" to permit implementing but disabling by default. To me, a capability that is implemented but is disabled by default is still available, and thus still provided. Imagine changing the "SHOULD NOT" to a "MUST NOT". I think it's reasonable to say that given a specification that says "MUST NOT provide DES", an implementation that implements DES capability but disables it by default nevertheless still provides it and would _not_ conform. > I thought we had consensus on the stronger wording to "SHOULD NOT > implement" which also seems preferrable, thus this change surprised me. I think there's no difference between "implement" and "provide" from the perspective of an implementor, but the fact that you appear to think that there is a difference implies that we do not yet have consensus about whether to specify that certain capabilities SHOULD NOT or MUST NOT be enabled by default. I suspect that if we have consensus to say something about default behavior, we would also have consensus to say "MUST NOT enable weak crypto by default". Do you believe that we should say something explicit about requirements for default behavior? _______________________________________________ ietf-krb-wg mailing list [email protected] https://lists.anl.gov/mailman/listinfo/ietf-krb-wg