Re: KDC model and atomicity
Nico Williams <[email protected]> Sun, 10 Jun 2012 19:47:59 -0500
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.krb-wg |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <CAK3OfOhbOyzWw53ERs9C2o3tnHk3p+ZNabiA=MLLHmZd+v+3pg@mail.gmail.com> |
On Sun, Jun 10, 2012 at 5:08 PM, Leif Johansson <[email protected]> wrote: > On 06/10/2012 10:25 PM, Greg Hudson wrote: >> I agree that N-strikes lockout, implemented through counters in the >> KDB, is not the final word on how one should respond to a >> password-guessing attack, and we don't want to carve it in stone. >> >> The simplest, and possibly best, thing to say about lockout in the >> information model is nothing. Of course, that doesn't help us get >> to the point of interoperating on administrative operations related >> to lockout (policy-setting and administrative unlock)--but that can >> always be the subject of future revisions to the model (or schema, >> or admin protocol). > > Well I think Nicos point was that you can't even implement the attribute > in question wo transactions across all KDCs in a realm. But Greg's is that our concern here should be about interop w.r.t. administration. I think that's clarifying. I think we want to say that there should be a way to set a policy indicating what action to take when password guessing attacks are detected, and roughly how to detect them while not being prescriptive about implementation. In other words, maybe we need a max number of failed password pre-auth attempts as a *policy*, and we should refrain from specifying any attributes regarding how the KDCs keep track of that number. I'd be happy with that. Nico -- _______________________________________________ ietf-krb-wg mailing list [email protected] https://lists.anl.gov/mailman/listinfo/ietf-krb-wg