Re: subjectAltName vs. CN in certificates

At 05:33 AM 3/7/2005, Hallvard B Furuseth wrote:
>This reminds me:
>
>Do implementations tend to obey this SHOULD (which is copied from
>RFC 2830)?

Well, s/the source/a source/ in the statement, yes.

The server identity could also be present in other subjectAltName
types, like ipAddress.

>> 3.1.6. Server Identity Check
>>     - If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present in the
>>       certificate, it SHOULD be used as the source of the server's
>>       identity.
>
>I've seen several mentions of a server accepting a host name
>matching the CN even though a different subjectAltName is present.
>If that is common, maybe the SHOULD above should be loosened to
>bless current practice - but probably not to say "SHOULD check
>both CN and subjectAltName".

I rather just s/the source/a source/.

>RL 'Bob' Morgan writes:
>>On Sun, 6 Mar 2005, Hallvard B Furuseth wrote:
>>>> 3.1.6. Server Identity Check
>>>
>>>>   Matching is performed according to these rules:
>>>
>>> Can someone remind me why this is specified here instead of in [TLS]?
>>> It doesn't look LDAP-specific.  I can't find the answer in the archive.
>>
>> TLS regards this as application-specific, and indeed applications do vary.
>> TLS for SMTP says almost nothing about server name checking, for example.
>
>-- 
>Hallvard