Re: Unfinished business: password policy and VLV
Jim Willeke <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ldapext |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
pwdCheckQuality Enforcement, I think, must be a choice on Auth and on all operations. There are conditions where this could force everyone who authenticates to change their password in a single day. With 1,000's or 1,000,000's of users, an organization would be overwhelmed. Some conditions I could think of are: - Change to the password policy - Transitioning to a new LDAP server or version. Where the "old" LDAP server did not use the or enforce the password policy. - Synchronization engines used to sync a password from a system whith a weaker policy to a system with a stronger policy. It sometimes difficult to match password policys between different vendors/versions of LDAP servers. -jim Jim Willeke On Mon, Aug 10, 2009 at 11:19 PM, Howard Chu <[email protected]> wrote: > Howard Chu wrote: > >> 9) In 7.4 (oops. forgot to take pwdGraceExpiry into account on this edit.) >> > > Fixed, will be in next draft. > > 12) In 8., note that if a single password value is stored in multiple >> formats >> simultaneously, it still counts as just a single password value. It's >> common >> when centralizing multiple systems (SASL, Samba, Kerberos, NSS) into LDAP >> to >> need to have the password in multiple forms. They are all equivalent and >> are >> always changed simultaneously, so they are effectively only one password. >> > > Equivalent text probably belongs in 4.3. > > 16) 9.5 Other Operations - also allow accountLocked result. This allows >> Search+ppolicy control to be used by SASL etc., instead of the >> ExternalBind >> stuff I mentioned in previous emails. >> > > This appears to be a mistake, I'm reverting this to the 09 version. > > There are still several TODO sections from 09 which I didn't touch. >> > > TODOs: > do we need to have configurable backoff algorithms for login delays? seems > like overkill. > > password safe modification, intruder detection - one possibility is to > force the session to immediately terminate on failure. That then > accomplishes the aim of requiring users to authenticate first. > > pwdCheckQuality, checking during authentication. Sounds like a good idea; > should it be done always, only when the stored password is hashed, or as a > configurable choice? The result should be that pwdReset is effectively set > when the verification succeeds. > > advertisement and discovery - the control should be advertised in > supportedControls in the rootDSE, what else needs to be said? > > administrativeRole - will use another OID under the current arc. > > ppolicy and replication - I think there are enough caveats in here now. > > IANA considerations - I've filled these in according to RFC4520. > > > -- > -- Howard Chu > CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com > Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/ > Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/ > _______________________________________________ > Ldapext mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ldapext > _______________________________________________ Ldapext mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ldapext