RE: Adding to the LDAP ACM to a WG charter
"Ed Reed" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ldup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
I didn't quite follow that, Ellen - "since this work cannot be finished in LDUP (ldapext is shutting down)" seems like a non-sequitor. Did you mean it can't be done in LDAPEXT? I come down in favor of a separate working group to hash out the end-all-and-be-all Access Control Model, or even an appropriate subset. In addition to the list of issues that Kurt raised, I'll point out that the X.500 model also includes provisions for Rule Based Access Control, which takes determination of appropriate security clearances, roles, etc. to be more important than the actual identity of the security principal, which is a particularly important manner of access control among very large, independently administered heterogeneous communities like the Internet. The X.500 work was, I think, done to address data handling constraints associated with the US DOD Defence Messaging System design, which is not getting much press today. However, the notion that interoperability between companies should follow a model that allows data administrators in the directory to set classification of data that requires role and clearance information to be authoritatively provided, without necessarily having any knowledge at all about the actual identity of the principal (anonymous, but trusted, vs anonymous and untrusted) is very attractive. Kurt's list of Authentication issues to discuss, together with the X.500 notion of Rule Based Authorization and the current market craze in favor of Role Based Authentication (where the ACI refers to a role, not an individual, and it's the job of the authentication service to provide information about the roles and clearance of the principal to relying services like the directory) should NOT be dealt with in LDUP, but rather a separate LDAPACM working group. The (proposed new) LDAPACM working group should work diligently to (a) not break LDAP, (b) store its policy and principal information in the Directory so that LDUP will replicate it, and detail as much as possible what special provisions, if any, are needed in LDUP to preserve the integrity of the ACM information. For instance, it might very well be a requirement that ACM information be sent by state-based replication schemes in LDUP BEFORE any of the data elements to which it applies is sent. I vote in favor of NOT doing LDAPACM in LDUP, but rather leaving LDUP to the task of shipping directory information around "safely", while leaving LDAPACM the opportunity to place SOME requirements on LDUP when those requirements are fully known. LDUP is useful (as was LDAPv2 and LDAPv3) even if it does not provide a complete, seamless, end-to-end, multi-vendor environment with a perfectly consistent management and security policy implementation. Lets get on with discovering what some of those uses are. Ed ================= Ed Reed Reed-Matthews, Inc. +1 585 624 2402 http://www.Reed-Matthews.COM Note: Area code is 585 >>> Ellen Stokes <[email protected]> 11/17/01 12:40PM >>> Security is important for a replicated environment. For the secure replicated heterogeneous environment to work, an access control model is necessary. Since this work cannot be finished in LDUP (ldapext is shutting down), the access control model needs a home. And given the complexity of the topic, it is insufficient to just release the spec as informational, experimental, or as an individual publication. I am FOR adding access control model to LDUP. Ellen