RE: Adding to the LDAP ACM to a WG charter
Ellen Stokes <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ldup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
The non-sequitor you point to is a typo on my part. I meant to say that the ACM work cannot be finished in LDAPext because that group is shutting down. Ellen At 11:17 AM 11/19/2001 -0700, you wrote: >I didn't quite follow that, Ellen - "since this work cannot be finished >in LDUP (ldapext is shutting down)" seems like a non-sequitor. Did >you mean it can't be done in LDAPEXT? > >I come down in favor of a separate working group to hash out >the end-all-and-be-all Access Control Model, or even an appropriate >subset. > >In addition to the list of issues that Kurt raised, I'll point >out that the X.500 model also includes provisions for Rule Based >Access Control, which takes determination of appropriate >security clearances, roles, etc. to be more important than the >actual identity of the security principal, which is a particularly >important manner of access control among very large, independently >administered heterogeneous communities like the Internet. > >The X.500 work was, I think, done to address data handling >constraints associated with the US DOD Defence Messaging System >design, which is not getting much press today. > >However, the notion that interoperability between companies >should follow a model that allows data administrators in the directory >to set classification of data that requires role and clearance >information to be authoritatively provided, without necessarily >having any knowledge at all about the actual identity of the >principal (anonymous, but trusted, vs anonymous and untrusted) >is very attractive. > >Kurt's list of Authentication issues to discuss, together with the >X.500 notion of Rule Based Authorization and the current market >craze in favor of Role Based Authentication (where the ACI >refers to a role, not an individual, and it's the job of the >authentication service to provide information about the roles >and clearance of the principal to relying services like the directory) >should NOT be dealt with in LDUP, but rather a separate >LDAPACM working group. > >The (proposed new) LDAPACM working group should work diligently >to (a) not break LDAP, (b) store its policy and principal information >in the Directory so that LDUP will replicate it, and detail as much >as possible what special provisions, if any, are needed in LDUP to >preserve the integrity of the ACM information. For instance, >it might very well be a requirement that ACM information >be sent by state-based replication schemes in LDUP BEFORE any >of the data elements to which it applies is sent. > >I vote in favor of NOT doing LDAPACM in LDUP, but rather >leaving LDUP to the task of shipping directory information around >"safely", while leaving LDAPACM the opportunity to place >SOME requirements on LDUP when those requirements are fully >known. > >LDUP is useful (as was LDAPv2 and LDAPv3) even if it does not provide >a complete, seamless, end-to-end, multi-vendor environment with >a perfectly consistent management and security policy implementation. > >Lets get on with discovering what some of those uses are. > >Ed > >================= >Ed Reed >Reed-Matthews, Inc. >+1 585 624 2402 >http://www.Reed-Matthews.COM >Note: Area code is 585 > > >>> Ellen Stokes <[email protected]> 11/17/01 12:40PM >>> > >Security is important for a replicated environment. > >For the secure replicated heterogeneous environment to work, an >access control model is necessary. > >Since this work cannot be finished in LDUP (ldapext is shutting >down), the access control model needs a home. > >And given the complexity of the topic, it is insufficient to just >release the spec as informational, experimental, or as an >individual publication. > >I am FOR adding access control model to LDUP. > >Ellen