Re: LDAPv3 Replication Access Control Design Team Report
"Timothy Hahn" <[email protected]> Thu, 12 Sep 2002 15:32:39 -0400
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.ldup |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Kurt, With respect to your comment: "Likewise, a standard framework for non-standard ACMs, by itself, is not sufficient." I have to ask: Why not? I thought LDUP was about "directory replication". Meaning, that for the information "replicated", the view of the information, when ANY of the servers which are participating in replicating that information, is intended to be the SAME. Furthermore, it is my belief that the IESG will not allow a protocol to be developed which would allow the same information to be distributed/replicated such that "controlled access" to that information could not be guaranteed. I suppose you could counter and say that by sending the information to a "client", a "server" is already unable to guarantee "controlled access". But it seems to me that for "replication", we're clearly talking about LDAP "server"s communicating with one another, with the intent that if a "client" lands on any one of those "replicating" servers, that the results of their query will be the SAME (modulo the "eventual convergence" issues of course). How can such a thing be provided unless the same access control semantics are applied (with respect to the information replicated)? Note here that I did not specify a PARTICULAR access control semantic - only that the replicating servers use the same access control semantic for the bits of information that is replicated. In one example provided it was stated that one server would want to allow "global read" to the information it held as a "replica". Would not the OTHER replica also offer that as well? I would assert YES, it would ... otherwise I wouldn't consider them "replicas", I'd consider them "synchronized". Perhaps I'm splitting hairs at this point. But I see the proposal laid forth as a way to 1) isolate away from LDUP the issues around defining a particular access control model (which is agreed by all to be a "rat hole"), while 2) providing a means for LDUP to show that "replicas" (and employment of replication protocol) is still SECURE (i.e. access to information replicated is "controlled" such that if a client accesses either replica, they will get the same result, for the information requested). Regards, Tim Hahn Internet: [email protected] Internal: Timothy Hahn/Durham/IBM@IBMUS phone: 919.224.1565 tie-line: 8/687.1565 fax: 919.224.2540 "Kurt D. Zeilenga" To: Richard Huber <[email protected]> <[email protected] cc: [email protected] g> Subject: Re: LDAPv3 Replication Access Control Design Team Report Sent by: owner-ietf-ldup@m ail.imc.org 09/11/2002 10:28 AM At 04:34 PM 2002-09-10, Richard Huber wrote: >If access controls are being used in a directory, the directory administrator has decided that it is important to >control access to all or part of the data in the tree. So if replication is used in a directory that has access >controls, there needs to be a way to make sure that those access controls are not lost because of replication. It not sufficient to just ensure access controls are not lost because of replication. http://www.imc.org/ietf-ldup/mail-archive/msg01261.html >A standard access control mechanism for all LDAP directories is one way to do this. A standard access control mechanism, by itself, is not sufficient. See above article. >But it can also be done by >making sure that the ACM in effect for any given part of the DIT is well defined, and that the definition can be >carried as part of the data being replicated. Likewise, a standard framework for non-standard ACMs, by itself, is not sufficient. Kurt