Re: Eric Rescorla's Discuss on draft-ietf-mboned-mtrace-v2-22: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 12:51 AM, Hitoshi Asaeda <[email protected]> wrote:

> Eric,
>
> (snip)
>
> >> Section 4.2.1, however (see below), prohibits processing of a Request
> that is not sent from an adjacent router. Also, it is worth considering
> that this problem hypothesis supposes that a DoS attack is launched from a
> trusted router address. Even for this scenario, however, the document does
> provide protection. The normative descriptions to which the quote above
> refers are:
> >>
> >> -  The previous paragraph from section 9.2 (requirement for use of
> ACLs; slightly reworded later in this email to the new proposed text):
> >>
> >> ----------
> >>   A router MUST support an access control list (ACL) mechanism to
> >>   filter out Queries from clients and Requests from peer router
> >>   addresses that are unauthorized or that are beyond a specified
> >>   administrative boundary.  This filtering could, for example, be
> >>   specified via a list of allowed/disallowed client and peer addresses
> >>   or subnets for the Mtrace2 protocol port.  If a Query or Request is
> >>   received from an unauthorized address or one beyond the specified
> >>   administrative boundary, the Query/Request MUST NOT be processed.
> >>   The router MAY, however, perform rate limited logging of such events.
> >> ----------
> >>
> >> and
> >>
> >>  - Section 4.2.1 (required validity checks to force rejection of a
> Request message from a source that is not an adjacent router):
> >>
> >> ----------
> >> 4.2.1.  Request Packet Verification
> >>
> >>   If the Mtrace2 Request does not come from an adjacent router, or if
> >>   the Request is not addressed to this router, or if the Request is
> >>     addressed to a multicast group which is not a link-scoped group
> >>   (i.e., 224.0.0.0/24 for IPv4, FFx2::/16 [3] for IPv6), it MUST be
> >>   silently ignored.  The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) [14]
> >>   SHOULD be used by the router to determine whether the router is
> >>   adjacent or not.
> >> ----------
> >
> > Unless I'm missing something, this just restricts things to a *node*
> which is adjacent. But if I'm a device that's on the same LAN as a router
> (which isn't a crazy proposition, ISTM), then why can't I mount this attack?
>
> Only an adjacent *multicast router* can send requests, because a request
> is transformed from a query initiated by a downstream node/device and
> forwarded toward the source/RP
>

But the difference between a request and a response is just some bits in
the packet. And so what stops some other host on the LAN from sending
something that claims to be a request.



> In your example, you are a valid *user (or device)* and send Request, and
> can attack someone. But in our definition, you cannot send any Requests
> because you are not a valid *multicast router*.
>

Yes, but that needs to be technically enforced, not just stated.


The problem you may think here is that the ACLs in general do not validate
> the Request is traversed from valid (or invalid) routers as the message
> types cannot be specified in ACLs, right?
> If we define a *particular* ACL entry to specify accepted/non-accepted IP
> addresses (or ranges) or admin boundaries for each of three mtrace message
> types, Query/Request/Reply, will your concern be disappeared?
>

I think so, if you require its use.


> To protect against spoofing of Request packet, as Kerry said,
> > > NOTE:  To protect against spoofing of Request packets by a trusted
> host, some authentication mechanism such as use of an Authentication Header
> (AH) between routing peers should be also considered. However, discussion
> of such external authentication mechanisms is out of the scope of this
> document.
>
> Also, router validation is in general defined in the routing protocol
> specifications and routers can run the authentication mechanisms. We do not
> provide an mtrace unique/specific authentication mechanism for routers in
> this document. But as the example, we can describe the PIM case to verify
> adjacent PIM neighbor routers, if it's helpful.
>

I don't follow this.


> Given that we're a week from Montreal, it might be easier to just try to
> meet there. What say you?
>
> Although Kerry may not, I'll be there.
> I asked a slot to report the current situation in the Mboned WG meeting.
> Please come to the meeting.
>

I have to be at RTCWEB.


But before the f2f discussions or the meeting, I need to understand and
> clarify problems you have been thinking.
>

The point of the F2F discussion is to clarify the issue.

-Ekr


> Regards,
>
> Hitoshi
>
> (snip a lot)
>
>

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