RE: MIDCOM MIB design question
"Harrington, David" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.midcom |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <6D745637A7E0F94DA070743C55CDA9BA013B175E@NHROCMBX1.ets.enterasys.com> |
Thanks Dave. I agree. Having two separate modules is not wrong; but it isn't necessary, and it doesn't bring any real benefits. You can simplify the VACM config using separate subtrees within the same module, or just separate tables. I expect that the network manager may want to look at some of the information being set by the MIDCOM agent, so two users will need access to the same data. A MIDCOM agent that had access to the statistics of different middleboxes might be able to choose which middlebox would provide the fastest/cleanest path between endpoints, so while not required to implement MIDCOM, access to the management information might be helpful. The data involved here appears to be closely related, and I recommend it be kept together in the same mib. The separation into different modules is just an unnecessary complexity based on thinking about two different applications and the specific objects they use. If we follow that reasoning, do we need to define a new mib module for every type of application that might look at MIDCOM data? Should we put the traps into a separate module because a fault/trap manager might only look at the traps? Should we separate the statistics from the mappings tables because some performance management applications only need the statistics and not the maps? Should we put NAT-related MIDCOM statistics in one module and the firewall-related MIDCOM statistics in another module because applications might focus on one or the other but not both? This is not a good way to approach defining a data set to monitor and manage MIDCOM functionality. -- You should understand something sbout me. One of the things I usually fight against is large modules; I prefer smaller modules because it makes it easier to advance the individual pieces. But you can break it down too fine as well, and then need to create multiple dependencies between the modules, which causes both to advance simultaneously in the advancement process. I also fight against that. I think using two mibs makes it more complex than necessary. How much more complex depends on how you do it. If N is counting the things created in M, you have a N->M normative dependency. If M is defining the priority of the rules created in N, then you have a M->N normative dependency. These modules will never be able to advance independent of each other. You haven't discussed whether your intention would be to publish two mibs in the same document, or different documents. If you put two mibs in the same document, then the issue of normative references between documents goes away and we can ignore it. If you define two mibs within the same document, you create the need to import a lot of the objects from one into the other. Under those conditions, I don't see a real benefit from doing this. There aren't major downsides either, but it does increase the complexity unnecessarily when you could simply use subtrees within the same mib. dbh > -----Original Message----- > From: Dave Shield [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Thursday, December 11, 2003 6:55 AM > To: Juergen Quittek > Cc: Harrington, David; Tom Taylor; [email protected]; [email protected] > Subject: Re: [midcom] MIDCOM MIB design question > > > > > Coming back to the MIDCOM MIB problem. On one side, there > is a set of > > objects that concerns the entire protocol operations: > statistics, the > > list of entities that established policies using the MIDCOM > protocol, > > the number of failed attempts to establish a MIDCOM session, etc. > > This should not be accessible to all potential entities > that are allowed > > to use the MIDCOM protocol. On the other side, there is the set of > > objects implementing the MIDCOM protocol. This set should > be accessible > > to a wider group of users. > > > > Now, Tom said that this security issue could be handled > more easily if > > we would use separate modules. I do not see anything wrong > with this. > > > Pardon me for chipping in, but I'm not quite sure how the > split between > MIB modules makes any difference to the security aspects of things. > Surely by the time access controls are applied, the MIB > module(s) will have > already been combined (even if only logically) into a single OID tree? > > I can see that having a suitable hierarchical structure for > the management > objects could well aid (or hinder) the configuration of > appropriate access > control settings. But what difference does it make whether > these objects > are defined in one module, or two? (Or even one module per object!) > > > The question of how to divide objects between MIB modules feels to be > more related to issues of convenience for implementation > and/or revision > management. > > So what am I missing? > > Dave > >