Re: Issue 60: Addresses in IKE_SA_INIT/AUTH
Jari Arkko <[email protected]> Mon, 24 Oct 2005 12:31:05 +0300
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mobike |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Tero Kivinen wrote: >I have really started to hate different variations in the protocol. > > I hate that too, but is there something we can do in this specific issue about that? Are you saying that your option would not create a new variant? >>Here's a suggested addition to the Security Considerations, >>Section 6.5, after the fourth paragraph: >> >>The use of NO_NATS_ALLOWED will also disclose the >>internal address to the peer, in case NAT was in the path. >>However, this has relevance only if the node is configured to first >>try with NO_NATS_ALLOWED and only then fallback to >>the use of NAT traversal if that fails. >> >> > >NO_NATS_ALLOWED discloses the internal address to the WORLD, not to >the peer. > > Hm. I missed this. Why does it reveal the address to the world? Because its sent in a too early IKE message that is not yet encrypted? --Jari