Re: D106 design draft issue: nat-p

A man-in-the-middle can't, but one of the participants
still can. You could explain this, but the resulting
text would be longer than what I proposed.

--Jari

Tero Kivinen wrote:

>[issue list: http://www.kivinen.iki.fi/ietf/mobike-design-issues.html
> working copy of document:
> http://www.kivinen.iki.fi/ietf/draft-ietf-mobike-design-06.txt]
>
>Jari Arkko writes:
>  
>
>>>  This gives extra
>>>   protection against 3rd party bombing attacks (the attacker cannot
>>>   divert the traffic to some 3rd party). 
>>>      
>>>
>>This seems inaccurate, or at least too strong. We have
>>other mechanisms to prevent that, and the NAT-T based
>>attack only works for on-path attackers. Just say
>>"This avoids any possibility of on-path attackers modifying
>>addresses in headers" and refer to Francis's pseudonat
>>attack draft.
>>    
>>
>
>Why do you think that NAT-preventation does not protect against 3rd
>party bombing attacks?
>
>If we do put all IP addresses used inside the packets, and
>cryptographically integrity protect them, and we enable NAT
>preventation, which means we do not allow NATs, how can attacker
>divert the traffic to some 3rd party?
>  
>