does mobike support end-to-end use of tunnel mode?
Jari Arkko <[email protected]> Fri, 27 Jan 2006 00:14:29 +0200
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mobike |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi, Erik read our protocol spec recently, and he had questions about the use of addresses in the protocol. Specifically, he was worried about "time shifting" or "address stealing" attacks where a host uses first address A in one place and then later B in another place. The question is what happens when some other host that comes later to the first place and gets the same address A as the first host. Will two hosts be able to communicate with the same peer? What will happen with ongoing sessions of the first host? I explained that in MOBIKE the outer addresses as such don't matter; they are just the tunnel endpoints (although Appendix A describes a case where an implementation can get this wrong). What matters is the inner addresses -- its those addresses that are used to match what packets go to what peer. Getting the address allocations right is essentially for the security of the system. This is indeed the case even without MOBIKE in base IKEv2 VPN usage*. However, Erik asked whether the document makes it clear that it only supports the scenario where at least one of the peers is a gateway that ensures the address allocations are correct. And I was unable to answer that. Are we making it clear enough? Also, is it possible to use MOBIKE in host-to-host tunnel mode? If so, how? And have the security considerations relating to such usage been described? Thoughts, anyone? Erik, feel free to post more detailed questions and concerns... --Jari *) But I was unable to find a statement either in RFC 4306 or the clarifications document about address allocation authorization issues.