RE: Some thoughts about "path failover"
"Jing Xiang" <[email protected]>
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mobike |
|---|---|
| Message-ID | <6204FDDE129D364D8040A98BCCB290EF0CEE717F@zbl6c004.corpeast.baynetworks.com> |
Judy, I too like the idea of using spi to specify address changes only for certain child SAs thus allowing different Child SAs to use different addresses. However I don't think a lot of addresses would be involved for the multi-homing case so I would prefer the complete address list sent rather than incremental changes with "DEL" & "ADD" options. With NAT, the main problem is when roaming from non-NAT or ipsec-aware-NAT to not-ipsec-aware NAT cases, in which UDP wrapper is required but not negotiated during tunnel establishment. I wonder if we can simplisticly solve this problem by requiring UDP wrapper be used in all roaming cases. Another way is to use the info-exch to signal whether to "add" or "take out" UDP wrapper. I like your idea of start using the new address without waiting for the RR but stop if RR is not successful within certain time limit. However I am not sure if piggyback would result in odd number of messages when IKEv2 requires message in pairs. Regards! /Jing -----Original Message----- From: Judy Fu [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 2:00 PM To: Tero Kivinen Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] Subject: Re: [Mobike] Some thoughts about "path failover" Hello, This is Judy Fu from Motorola Labs. I have been reading information/documents on the Mobike web sites and I am greatly interested. I have some thoughts and ideas for a discussion. Jari Arkko writes: Overall conclusion: I think your list looks very good and complete. Based on my 2 GW example, I am starting to think we need the address lists and not just a single address. First, I agree with Jari and Tero that we need address lists. I also think it is a useful feature to allow users to change some of the IPsec SAs. I have an idea on mobike message formats that are actually combining Pasi, Tero and Francis's drafts. The basic idea is as follows. In default case, a mobile device just send USE_DYNAMIC_ADDRESS_UPDATES Notify payload as specified in Pasi's SMOBIKE draft. This case uses minimal signaling. At default, all SPIs are changed. When a user needs to change only some of the SAs or wants to send an address list for multihoming case, a special message format similar to Tero's draft is used. In addition to address notify payload specified in Tero's draft, we can have SPI notify payload such as the one specified in Francis's address management draft. To make the address change flexible, we can have add, delete, change from <addr> to <addr> options. While we want to reuse existing payload format, there should be no problem to design a new format if necessary. Another potential notify payload I am thinking of is traffic selector. In a mobile network scenario with a IPSec tunnel between two mobile routers, could the mobile routers' mobility cause traffic selector change and is there a need to notify the traffic selector change upon mobile routers' move? Second, I think NAT traversal issue may be resolved by the following way. NAT traversal issue arises because the peer that is not behind NAT couldn't send messages through NAT using the new address. The idea is for the IPsec peer that is not behind NAT to simply use old address to send the address change Notify payloads as specified above to change address. For NAT traversal, IPsec can dynamically keep and update new addresses and use new address to send IKEv2 and ESP packets. Then IPsec should also be able to store old address and use old address to send notify payloads for NAT traversal. After the peer behind NAT receives the address update and starts to send packets to the new address, other packets from the peer that is not behind NAT will go through. Third, I have an idea of piggybacked return routability check. I think return routability check is useful to prevent a DoS attack in which an attacker subscribes to heavey stream media service and claims to change address to an address that he does not own. Then stream media will be sent to the victim device to bring it down. Although an attacker on the transmission path can launch redirect attack anyway, the attack using address change is more effortless in that the attacker device does not need to keep redirecting traffic. To prevent this attack, a piggybacked return routability check is good enough. With this scheme, the peer will start to send traffic once receiving address update without waiting, and piggyback or send return routability message at the same time, The peer can set a timer and stop traffic upon timeout if return routability check has failed. The advantage of this scheme is to prevent DoS attack described above without latency or handoff delay caused by return routability check. Your comments are appreciated. Best Regards Judy