Re: New issue 18: Threat discussion

 In your previous mail you wrote:

   Actually, let me rephrase:
   
   I do not want to imply that "transient pseudo-NAT" attack has no 
   relevance for MOBIKE. MOBIKE is all about authenticated management
   of (change of) address. And "pseudo-NAT" is about malicious change
   of address. 
   
   So there is definite relevance there.
   
   The issue is that problem can be manifested in several scenarios 
   other than just IKE.

=> in my draft I talk about signaling protocols with two concrete
examples, mobile IP (look at RFC 3519 security considerations)
and IKE. IMHO MOBIKE is concerned both for itself and as a source
of clarification for IKE in a mobile/multi-homed environment.

   It may make sense to either do a general solution
   (else where?)

=> there is an easy solution but obviously incompatible with NAT traversal.

   or if we do MOBIKE-specific solution,

=> I don't believe in a MOBIKE-specific solution. In fact, the current
discussion is about the defense against "third party bombing" which
includes "transient pseudo-NAT"/

   we should let other affected working groups be made aware of it.
   
=> this is done for mobile IP and this is a bit late for IKE (in fact
this is covered by the pki4ipsec profile in its default policies).
But IMHO it will be good to include somewhere in a MOBIKE document
a clarification about this attack, just in order to avoid unsafe
misinterpretation of the IKEv2 address agility.

Regards

[email protected]