Re: New issue 18: Threat discussion

 In your previous mail you wrote:

   >       3) Unauthenticated attacker causes the IKE_SA to be
   >          closed by modifying just one or two IKE packets (if
   >          attacker can modify all packets, he can of course DoS).
   >    
   > => I have a concern with this because it is not a MOBIKE threat
   > but an IKE one. I propose to rewrite it, adding for example
   > that MOBIKE should not add a new vulnerability (i.e., MOBIKE
   > should be as resillient as IKE, BTW this should be easy to do).
   
   Ok. Do you have suggested text?
   
=> I have a simpler (simplest :-) proposal: this attack doesn't work
because an unauthenticated attacker cannot produce valid IKE messages
after the IKE_SA_INIT exchange, i.e., only a brute force DoS can cause
the IKE_SA to be closed.

Thanks

[email protected]

PS: the key word is "unauthenticated".