Internet Source address filtering in 3G Networks
Greg Daley <[email protected]> Tue, 29 Jul 2003 10:45:11 +1000
| Newsgroups | gmane.ietf.mobileip |
|---|---|
| Organization | Monash University |
| Message-ID | <[email protected]> |
Hi Xiaobao, [email protected] wrote: [much discussion cut] >>should fix this problem in the GPRS gateway nodes. > > > Thank you for proposing a solution which we had considered very carefully > before we raised the issues to group.This solution would require some > fundamental changes to the current GPRS/UMTS deployments that are already in > operation or being rolled out. This could involve major cost and have > significant implications for networks. > > Alternatively,changing GPRS/UMTS means to change the GPRS/UMTS specs to > restrict the use of some or all of MIPv6 functions in GPRS/UMTS IPv6 nodes. I > am sure very few people would like to see this practice. > > Even if GPRS/UMTS could be changed to support MIPv6, do you think that these > kind of " packet filtering" are only limited to GPRS/UMTS network ? As you mentioned in your draft, current ISP source address filtering is to prevent nodes on the ISP's own access network from spoofing addresses on outbound packets. This is not what GPRS/UMTS networks do. It's worth considering what types of devices currently undertake packet classification on ingress to an access network, from the Internet, based on Source addresses today. These are essentially: Firewalls (including application level proxies, and stateful L3 agents) and NAT systems. There aren't many others. In the case of firewalls, it is part of the process that firewalls inspect outbound packets (such as signalling packets for Multimedia sessions) and make modifications to the filter state for this. This is done routinely as new protocols are adopted. It doesn't need hardware upgrades (although software upgrades are required). This has been the case for many years, and such change becomes driven by the balance between user and service provider or enterprise security policy. If there is no business case to modify the (in this case firewall) devices, then the change will not take place. Modifications to network protocols (especially protocols which have been in standardization processes for as long a time as MIPv6) take MUCH longer and have impact further afield than the systems experiencing problems due to packet filtering. This can be seen with the case of NATs (which also experience loss if packets arrive with different header formats than those previously registered). It is important that the introduction of packet filtering or classification technology in one environment doesn't force modification of protocols such as IPSec, or MobileIP, simply because the next header is not TCP, or because an address may change. We're talking about having end-to-end communucations here, so the presence of intermediate machines either should be unobtrusive, or explicitly configured on the applicable hosts. Just dropping packets isn't good enough. Greg