Re: identifiers and security

El 01/07/2004, a las 21:15, Erik Nordmark escribió:

>> I am not sure how slightly this is...
>>
>> suppose a host A with Locator LA
>> A server B with locator LB
>> and an attacker X with locator LX
>>
>> A usually connects to B to get some information, for instance the 
>> news.
>>
>> Now, X manages to be on the path between A and B for a while.
>> Now, X starts a communication with A and pretends to be B, and X
>> creates a state in A mapping the identifier of A with locator LX.
>> Note that it can do that because the verification will be based on the
>> RR and X will succeed because he is on the path.
>> Then, X leaves the place and goes to somewhere more comfortable for 
>> him
>>
>> Now, in the future when A tries to reach B he will contacting X...
>> forever ;-)
>>
>> I don't feel that this would be acceptable
>
> I agree at some level, because this was the conservative approach that
> was taken in the MIPv6 security design.
>
> But one can argue against that by:
>  - if the attacker was on the path, why couldn't the attacker leave a 
> small
>    device (running on a battery for a month for instance) attached?
>

:-)

i would argue that the attacker is still on the path (so you can do 
this in single homed internet), and this is not a time shifted attack, 
but i see your point.

regards, marcelo

>   Erik
>