Re: TASL

Erik Nordmark wrote:
>>Since the protocol exchange is protected by TLS, we are certain
>>that no 3rd party has injected bogus locators or been able to
>>observe the locator exchange. Thus, whichever host initially
>>responded to locator ULID2 is the only one able to send and receive
>>news of alternative locators, and only to the host that initially
>>used locator ULID1. This seems to cover a lot of the multihoming
>>threats.
> 
> 
> This assumes that the responder has a certificate?
> What is the binding between that certificate and the identity of the
> responder? Based on the FQDN matching, or based on having IP address(es)
> in the certificate?

Personally I'd rather avoid any DNS dependence so maybe it has to be
address based... but I'm too tired to think very clearly tonight...

> Assuming we worry about pre-meditated attacks (aka time-shifting attacks)
> we do need a reasonably strong binding between the cert and the responder.

Yes
> 
> 
>>Note that this is all a one-way solution as far as the ULP is concerned.
>>If ULP packets come back from host 2 to host 1, the whole thing is
>>repeated independently in the reverse direction.
> 
> 
> Does this mean that a separate tls session is established in the reverse 
> direction?

In the general case I think so, but it might be possible to optimize
it out in many cases.

> Would the initiator of the communication need a TLS certificate?

That seems likely to be necessary.

The idea is half baked of course - I just wanted it on the table in
case it has any merit.

    Brian